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OFFSETTING AND THE CONSUMPTION OF 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
EZRA ROSSER
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the relationship between individual consumption 
and consumption-based harms by focusing on the rise in consumption 
offsetting. Carbon offsets are but the leading edge of a rise in consumer 
options for offsetting externalities associated with consumption. Moving 
from examples of quasi offsetting to environmental offsetting and the 
possibility of poverty offset institutions, I argue that offsetting provides a 
valuable mechanism for individuals to correct for the harms associated 
with consumption. This Article makes two major contributions to how we 
understand the relationship between consumption and social 
responsibility. First, it identifies an emerging offsetting phenomenon in 
seemingly discrete market practices and gives suggestions for improving 
upon them. Second, it suggests that by taking seriously both consumption 
and externalities, progress can be made on everything from the 
environment to global poverty. Offsetting, while not getting at all moral or 
societal obligations, does root such obligations in the shared activity, and 
perhaps belief, of Americans: consumption. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Consumers today routinely pair their consumption with charity or 
subject their consumption choices to their social commitments. Whether in 
the form of offset payments or post-consumption charitable giving, 
individuals are linking their consumption to their sense of social 
responsibility. To some extent this has always been true: beggars have 
probably concentrated outside of stores since time immemorial and there 
is a lengthy history of boycotts being used as a tool of social change. But 
the explosion of end-of-the-checkout-line charitable options, together with 
the increasing prevalence of social marketing, attests to the rise of a new 
phenomenon as well.
1
  
Americans are consuming social responsibility; that is, they are both 
attempting to ensure their consumption does not conflict with their sense 
of social responsibility and hoping consumption can be the means of 
 
 
 1. The term ―social marketing‖ originated in 1971 and refers to the use of marketing techniques 
to advance social causes. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of 
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 81 n.69 (1999) (quoting PHILIP 
KOTLER & EDUARDO L. ROBERTO, SOCIAL MARKETING: STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING PUBLIC 
BEHAVIOR 24 (1989)). Although not how the term is used here, the rise of social networking websites 
has introduced a competing definition of ―social marketing‖ related to marketing done through such 
websites. See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009).  
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meeting their social responsibilities.
2
 This Article is about what I call 
―consumption offsetting.‖ Although such language borrows from the 
environmental field, carbon credits and carbon offsetting are but examples 
on the leading edge of a larger trend.  
This Article is part descriptive, part normative. The literature on 
offsetting to date focuses on environmental offsetting and has not explored 
offsetting in other contexts. As the first article to identify quasi offsetting 
behavior and consider consumer responsibility for other social harms, my 
conclusions are necessarily preliminary. Accordingly, although I argue 
that the consciousness-raising aspects of offsetting overwhelm the 
possibility that offsetting will crowd out other sorts of pro-social activity, 
my principal contributions do not depend upon answering such questions. 
Fully teasing out all the policy implications of the idea behind offsetting—
that individuals should pay for their consumption externalities—is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Offsetting relies upon voluntary payments, but 
the underlying idea suggests that the law should work on the 
internalization of these externalities. Many readers will no doubt conclude 
that offsetting highlights the need for greater regulation and prevention of 
harmful production and consumption externalities.
3
 But the goal is not to 
provide an account of the externalities that should be prohibited. This 
Article‘s ambitions are far more preliminary and modest: to introduce 
offsetting as a budding market phenomenon, to argue poverty is ripe for 
offsetting, and to suggest a few institutional improvements on current 
consumer offsetting practices.  
I argue that there is a spectrum of offsetting, with pure consumption at 
one end and examples of institutional offsetting at the other. In the middle 
lie practices—most notably corporate social responsibility—that bridge 
consumption and social responsibility for the externalities of consumption. 
I resist a narrowing of the conception of offsetting because a reductionist 
account misses the richness of the current market phenomenon. The 
second half of the Article focuses just on institutional offsetting, but by 
first exploring quasi offsetting practices that occupy the gray area between 
 
 
 2. ―Consumption‖ here means both physical consumption of goods and symbolic consumption 
of social values. See Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and 
Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10825, 10829–32 (2008) (exploring competing definitions of 
consumption).  
 3. Offset institutions, like other private governance institutions, arguably ―arise to meet an 
unmet public demand for governance.‖ Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional 
Typology of Private Governance Institutions 3 (Oct. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690831.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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consumption and third-party offsetting, we can better understand the 
origins and rise of institutional offsetting.  
Part I focuses on market failures to help explain why consumers 
engage in consumption offsetting. After challenging the standard 
assumption that markets correctly price goods and introducing the idea of 
externalities, I focus on the role of governance vacuums and powerful 
commercial interests. There is a deep and rich literature on market failure 
and for those comfortable with the topic, Part I can be skimmed. For those 
who embrace the tenets of laissez-faire economics, Part I challenges blind 
faith in free markets. The central argument is that prices of goods do not 
reflect production externalities.  
Part II tackles consumption offsetting. The defining characteristic of 
offsetting is the decision to make a supplemental payment that exceeds 
what the market demands in connection with consumption and to do so for 
charitable or socially responsible reasons. Parts on localism, corporate 
social responsibility, hybrid vehicles, and production certifications explore 
parts of the offsetting spectrum where the extra expense may or may not 
amount to offsetting. I then move to environmental offsetting. By 
decoupling offsetting from products and providing standalone offsetting 
institutions and options, the environmental field has taken the lead in 
developing mechanisms for consumptive offsetting. Environmental offsets 
are an example of an increasingly accepted and, in some circles, expected 
way to correct for consumptive externalities. And though the offset 
concept is more familiar in the environmental field, similar logic regarding 
externalities applies to the relationship between consumption and other 
social issues.  
Part II ends by highlighting one particular social issue, poverty, where 
consumptive offsetting could be productively expanded and improved 
through unifying institutions.
4
 Blending charitable giving, guilt-inspired 
donations, and deliberate lifestyle adjustments, ―poverty offsetting‖ 
describes a species of activity that recognizes the need to ameliorate some 
of the negative effects of consumption. Behind these supplemental 
payments is the understanding that individual consumption is not a 
discrete, isolated activity, but instead relates directly to local and 
especially global poverty.
5
  
 
 
 4. Additionally, I have written a follow-up article that further explores the idea of poverty 
offsetting introduced in this section. See Ezra Rosser, Poverty Offsetting, 6 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Rosser, Poverty Offsetting].  
 5. The connection consumers have to international poverty is different than their connection 
with domestic poverty, in no small part because domestically consumers are also citizens empowered 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/2
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The idea that social responsibility is something to consume or is 
connected with consumption will strike many as inappropriate or even 
dangerous. In Part III, I respond to concerns about capturing people when 
they have their wallet or charge card in hand. Offsetting arguably serves to 
legitimize or support consumption and some people may treat offset 
expenses as the full extent of their societal obligations. An additional 
argument against consumption offsetting is that it reinforces capitalism‘s 
consumptive-driven structure, diminishing the possibility of radical 
change. According to this critique, offsetting sells cheap consumption 
licenses and co-opts the socially responsible who might otherwise demand 
more meaningful change.  
I respond to such arguments by rejecting the necessity of radical 
change and assert instead that consumption offsetting can help individuals 
realize their obligations. Although offsetting is limited to righting 
consumption externalities, it does not displace non-consumption-based 
obligations. Structurally, offsetting accepts the important role consumption 
plays in our society but does so in a way that awakens the social 
consciousness to the costs of consumption. Just as the conservative 
assumption that the market consistently prices goods appropriately cannot 
survive close scrutiny, the leftist assumption that market mechanisms 
should not be used to help with social issues is also overly simplistic. 
Improving the norms and institutions of consumption offsetting will make 
it more likely, not less, that people will appreciate and act upon their many 
obligations—those tied to their consumption and those not.  
This Article makes two major contributions to how we understand the 
relationship between consumption and social responsibility. First, it 
identifies an emerging offsetting phenomenon in seemingly discrete and 
isolated market practices and gives suggestions for improving upon them.
6
 
Second, it suggests that by taking seriously both consumption and 
externalities, progress can be made on everything from the environment to 
global poverty. Offsetting, while not getting at all moral obligations, does 
root such obligations in the shared activity, and perhaps belief, of 
Americans: consumption.
7
  
 
 
to determine everything from workplace protections to minimum wage requirements. In keeping with 
the preliminary nature of this work, and partly out of concern that drawing out these distinctions risks 
overemphasizing them, this Article tables further elaboration.  
 6. Identifying existing behavior currently operating below the cultural radar helps raise the 
visibility of such practices, which in turn can lead to increased enforcement of associated social norms. 
See Jed S. Ela, Comment, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to 
Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 93, 100 (2009).  
 7. In the wake of 9/11, for example, politicians told Americans that shopping was the way they 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES  
When we enter a store, rows of products are on display, but the work 
involved in creating and bringing products to market is typically hidden 
from view. Our perspective on the production process is limited, with the 
only information readily available being what is presented by the nature of 
the product itself, by the packaging, and by the price. It is nearly 
impossible to know the conditions at factories where the products were 
produced, the wages paid to workers, or the amount of pollution created in 
the process. Given such ignorance, with a few exceptions, we simply 
pretend as if the production process does not matter.  
Our indifference, or at least inattention, to production processes helps 
ensure that negative externalities accompany the production of many 
goods.
8
 Consumers tend to make purchasing decisions based on price; 
when sorting between near identical options, if a substitute good‘s price is 
low enough, we pick the substitute.
9
 Producers, faced with the downward 
price pressures of competition and consumer inattention to production, 
rationally respond by keeping production costs low. One way to do this is 
to pass along production costs—to neighbors, to employees, to society, to 
the environment, etc.—as much as possible. ―Passing along costs‖ sounds 
evil or nefarious, but it need not be viewed that way. Instead, it simply 
means—because the law does not require it of them—that producers do 
not have to take into account all the costs of production, in terms of effects 
on others or the world.
10
  
Economists call these costs ―negative externalities.‖ To understand 
what constitutes an ―externality,‖ it is worth quoting at length a classic 
formulation by Harold Demsetz:  
 Externality is an ambiguous concept. For the purposes of this 
paper, the concept includes external costs, external benefits, and 
 
 
could help the U.S. recover from the attacks. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The 
Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 526–27 
(2004) [hereinafter Kysar, Preferences for Processes]. ―[T]his conflation of patriotism with 
consumption, of civic life with market life,‖ id. at 527, while reflecting a lost opportunity for an 
expanded notion of citizenship, captures the centrality of consumption in the United States.  
 8. See id. at 536 (noting that ―[f]or the most part‖ consumers have ―institutionalized ignorance‖ 
of production processes).  
 9. Price is paramount with luxury goods too, but inversely so—consumers look for high prices 
and manufacturers may insist upon high prices as a form of signaling. See Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust 
Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 261, 277 (2008).  
 10. In the environmental context, through the cumulative impact of producers who do not have to 
take pollution into account, pollution is overproduced. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons 
and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 534–35 (2007).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/2
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pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary externalities. No harmful or 
beneficial effect is external to the world. Some person or persons 
always suffer or enjoy these effects. What converts a harmful or 
beneficial effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing the 
effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting 
persons is too high to make it worthwhile, and this is what the term 
shall mean here.
11
 
According to Demsetz, the reason there are externalities is that it is too 
costly to make actors take into account particular harmful or beneficial 
effects. Everything from diffused harm with multiple victims (think of the 
challenge society has had regulating greenhouse gas emissions) to an 
entrenched powerful interest group (the fishing industry, for example) can 
make it too costly to convert some effects into property rights. 
Externalities can be positive or negative, and most production activities 
generate both. Bob‘s Honey Farm, for example, may have many beehives. 
Bob sells the honey produced by the bees but the bees also serve as 
pollinators for neighboring apple farms. Notice the positive externality: 
the neighboring apple farmers need not pay Bob anything, yet they benefit 
from their proximity to Bob‘s bees.12 On the other hand, Bob‘s Honey 
Farm may also be located near an elementary school where students suffer 
an unusually high number of bee stings. In the absence of laws to the 
contrary, Bob does not have to take bee stings into account as a cost of 
production. Such stings are negative externalities that allow Bob to sell his 
honey for less than he would if he had to pay to fully enclose his bees.  
A. Market Pricing  
―The price is right‖—to borrow from the television game show—sums 
up a central assumption of both American consumers and neoclassical 
economists. While in other countries there exists a tradition of negotiating 
over price, in the United States haggling is almost nonexistent. And while 
consumers do comparison shop and bargain hunt, there is implicit 
acceptance that price corresponds to value and that price is market 
determined. Except in rare moments (after a hurricane) or for certain 
 
 
 11. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967). 
For alternative definitions of externalities, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 40–41 (3d ed. 2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 72 (7th ed. 
2007).  
 12. See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & 
ECON. 11 (1973).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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important products (oil or gold), price is treated as a given, subject to little 
discussion. Adam Smith‘s ―invisible hand‖ is considered just that, 
invisible and unchallenged by most Americans, and while product prices 
guide purchases, explanation for pricing is not usually sought by 
consumers.
13
 
Neoclassical economists make the same assumption but do so under a 
protective layer of theory. For economists, price (and quantity) is 
determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves.
14
 The 
beauty of the model conceals the simplifying assumptions economists rely 
upon in practice. Economists say that market exchanges occur when the 
buyer values the good at or above the price at which it is being offered. 
But economists tend to accept price as equivalent to value and to not spend 
much time on the decision-making processes of individuals.
15
 Perhaps the 
biggest assumption is that the buyer has perfect information about the 
product being offered; indeed, it is standard practice to treat buyers and 
sellers as if they have perfect information about the entire market. This 
assumption is critical to economic analysis because it allows purchasing 
decisions to be treated as revealed preferences. Yet, according to Ronald 
Coase, search and information costs are one of the three major categories 
of transaction costs.
16
 If transaction costs are small, they can be thought of 
as sand in the cogs of capitalism; if they are big, transaction costs can 
overwhelm pricing assumptions. As the economics profession has moved 
away from economic history and broader theory towards economics based 
on mathematical models—what Paul Krugman describes as ―the rise of the 
equations guys‖17—transaction costs have been assumed away. Though 
 
 
 13. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 572 (Bantam Classics 2003) (1776). 
 14. For a non-economist‘s explanation of this point of equilibrium, see Sinden, supra note 10, at 
541–43.  
 15. Behavioral economics is the exception; not surprisingly, studies of behavior often reveal that 
humans do not act as the perfectly rational actors assumed by standard neo-classical economics. Stated 
differently, ―[r]eal people aren‘t much like Homo economicus, so the latter makes a poor model for the 
former.‖ Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 55 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 629, 637 (2007). For this reason, many scholars have argued that the law and economics 
approach needs to become the law and behavioral science approach. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, 
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 35–55 (1989); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 
(2000).  
 16. See RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1990). The other two 
transaction cost categories, according to Coase, are (1) bargaining and decision costs and (2) policing 
and enforcement costs. Id.  
 17. Paul Krugman, An Institutional Economics Prize, NYTIMES.COM BLOG: THE CONSCIENCE 
OF A LIBERAL (Oct. 12, 2009, 8:12 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/an-institu 
tional-economics-prize.  
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economists are aware of the role transaction costs can play, generally their 
models do not include such complexity. The simplifying assumption of 
perfect information echoes the larger simplification that, except in rare 
circumstances, market equilibrium of supply and demand alone drives 
pricing.
18
 The role of the government in establishing the conditions and 
terms of the market is lost, as is the possibility that producers might take 
advantage of buyer ignorance of production processes.
19
  
This is not to deny the dynamism of capitalistic competition, just to 
suggest that competition takes place within—indeed is made possible 
because of—a larger institutional structure and that this structure plays an 
important role in determining price.
20
 In this Article, I provide an 
explanation for why some goods may be priced incorrectly and unpack a 
socially responsible way consumers can correct such pricing problems. To 
explain how products could cost too little, I focus on production and 
consumption externalities understood broadly. Governance shortcomings 
 
 
 18. Critical legal scholars, among others, argue convincingly that there is no such thing as ―the 
market,‖ singular. Rather there are lots of markets, subject to different regulations and norms, 
occupying unique social space, and reaching efficient outcomes differently. See, e.g., ROBERTO 
MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 203–04 (1998); 
Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 
AM. U. L. REV. 939, 963–67 (1985). The market that most closely approximates the efficient, zero 
transaction cost market assumed by economists is perhaps the New York Stock Exchange. After all, 
price moves from one second to the next, all buyers are supposed to have equal information (because 
of the prohibition on insider trading), and fees for changing positions in the market are de minimus. 
But even the stock market, like every other market, is subject to overarching regulation that raises 
questions about what the term ―free market‖ means. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Democratic 
Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1053–54 (2009) 
(―[M]arkets are not states of nature; they are regulated by law, and the legal rules defining property 
rights are a major element of that regulation.‖). Formal law, norms, and other forms of regulation play 
an important role in determining the nature of any particular market and product pricing. See, e.g., 
Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market Structure in Colonial New 
Zealand, 34 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 47, 53 (2000); Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market 
Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 19–24 (1988).  
 19. Ironically, despite the prevalence of transaction costs and the information problems of 
buyers, the persuasive burden is on those who challenge the assumption of perfectly functioning 
markets. Oliver Williamson‘s description of the general ―neglect of transaction costs‖ by economists is 
worth highlighting: 
Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. . . . But 
whereas physicists were quickly reminded by their laboratory instruments and the world 
around them that friction was pervasive and often needed to be taken expressly into account, 
economists did not have a corresponding appreciation for the costs of running the economic 
system.  
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 19 (1985).  
 20. The institutions of capitalism are as macro as formal laws that establish the terms of market 
competition and as micro as informal norms in the community and even at the family level. For more 
on the expansive scope of institutions and institutional analysis, see Douglass C. North, Ideology and 
Political/Economic Institutions, 8 CATO J. 15 (1988).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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often allow companies to keep private cost per unit below the social cost 
of each unit. Once the linked assumptions of (1) efficient pricing, (2) a 
single market type, and (3) price-value equivalence are discarded, the 
focus shifts from economic modeling to the role of public and private 
institutions in establishing market conditions and production expectations.  
B. Market Failures 
Offset spending by consumers takes place because of awareness of, and 
desire to correct for, the harmful externalities associated with 
consumption. Such externalities reflect governance vacuums. Thinking of 
externalities in this way, while not contradicting Demsetz‘s definition of 
externalities as effects not associated with a corresponding property right, 
highlights the policy choices involved in permitting externalities.  
To explain what I mean by ―governance vacuums,‖ it is worth 
revisiting externalities in a context familiar to most readers: the classroom. 
On the second day of Property, after students have signed the seating 
chart, I ask them if they have a property right in their seat. Debate ensues 
between students who think that they do because they can expect to be 
able to occupy it during class and students who think they do not because 
the professor can take away that expectation at any point. I then ask if any 
students would like to change seats. In large classrooms where every seat 
is occupied, students who arrived late the first day and did not get to pick 
their seats often raise their hands. The main reason students say they want 
to change seats is that they did not get a seat at what is their ideal distance 
from the professor: some students in the back rows would prefer to be 
front and center, some students in the front would prefer to hide in the 
back. But when class ends, students often tell me less neutral reasons such 
as: (1) someone in front of them plays solitaire on his computer during 
class and it is distracting or (2) the person next to them likes to smoke 
before class and they do not want to have to smell the lingering smoke all 
class. Both (1) and (2) are forms of externalities: the game player and the 
smoker have negative effects on those around them but typically do not 
take into account the harm they are causing when deciding to play 
computer games or smoke. These are also examples of governance 
vacuums. Policies could be instituted that would prevent such harms from 
occurring or that would compensate those harmed. I could follow the lead 
of some other professors and simply not allow the use of computers in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/2
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class.
21
 Or I could forbid students from playing games or surfing the web 
in class. By not instituting either rule, I have effectively chosen to allow 
the externality to exist.
22
 The same can be said of the smoking externality: 
if society or the school prohibited smoking, nonsmokers would not have to 
deal with lingering secondhand smoke. Less draconian measures could 
also be adopted: smokers could be allowed to smoke, but only if they did 
so in areas with sufficient ventilation,
23
 or there could be a rule against 
entering the school within a half hour of smoking.
24
 The absence of 
regulation that would force the harm-causing individuals to take into 
account the effect they have on others permits the externalities to exist and 
continue. And while regulation is not inherently preferable to non-
regulation, it is the choice to leave a governance vacuum that allows for 
the externalities.  
Recognition of governance vacuums ex post—after society has decided 
to disallow a particular activity through regulation filling the vacuum—is 
easier than ex ante recognition. Precisely because some consumers may 
see a governance vacuum while others see the acceptable workings of 
capitalism, there may be debate ex ante about whether regulation is 
appropriate. The line between allowed and disallowed practices changes 
over time, converting what was accepted by one generation to something 
not accepted by the next. Such change is partly based on increased 
understanding of the externalities of particular products or actions.
25
 But 
increased knowledge is just part of the explanation; the pressures of 
population growth force additional emphasis on protecting against 
externalities. Perhaps most importantly, expanded expectations of 
behavior seem to accompany human progress. Although some will 
attribute causation to higher standards of living while others will 
emphasize the rise of human rights norms, for whatever reason people 
today have different understandings of what practices should be 
disallowed than did people in prior time periods.  
 
 
 21. See David Cole, Laptops vs. Learning, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2007, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/06/AR2007040601544.html (discussing banning 
laptops in his law classes).  
 22. Personal note: I have not done so because I do not want to be a hypocrite, having played 
SimCity in my tax class as a law student.  
 23. Creation of nonsmoking zones in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s protected 
areas from secondhand smoke and, by creating an entitlement to smoke-free space, ―empowered 
nonsmokers to complain about smoking.‖ Ela, supra note 6, at 108.  
 24. Smokers may disapprove, but having had students come to office hours reeking of smoke, I 
have contemplated implementing a similar rule for my office.  
 25. For example, with time, medical professionals may discover that a product (say lead-based 
paint) purchased for one purpose might harm children‘s health.  
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Suppose there were workers with unique characteristics that made them 
best able to produce widgets. Suppose also that widgets were popular and 
producers could make the most money if they hired such workers to 
produce them. Standard economic theory might argue that in such cases 
the producer would offer wages high enough to attract such workers and 
that the market for widgets would guarantee the most efficient outcome. 
But what if the best employees for this particular type of work happen to 
be children? It was not until President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 
Fair Labor Standards Act in 1939 that the United States instituted firm 
restrictions on child labor. Until that time, child labor was an accepted 
practice, supported by arguments that prohibition would deny children an 
education and would raise the price of goods.
26
 A similar story could be 
told about Freon, a chemical widely used in refrigeration and air 
conditioning systems. Freon‘s unique chemical characteristics made it the 
product of choice through the 1980s.
27
 Unfortunately, Freon is also a 
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), a chemical type with a particularly harmful 
impact on the ozone layer.
28
 Awareness of the problems of CFCs preceded 
domestic and global efforts to effectively reduce the manufacturing of 
CFCs by decades, during which time consumption continued, as did 
growth of the hole in the ozone.
29
 Another way to think about the 
continued harm is that pricing was artificially low because consumers 
were not paying for the damage to the ozone made possible by an 
environmental governance vacuum. The purpose of observing changing 
norms is not to celebrate the present—after all, future generations may 
look back on our allowed practices with scorn—but to highlight the 
inevitability, even when we do not fully appreciate their existence, of 
governance vacuums.  
 
 
 26. Child labor, it was argued, was a way for children to develop useful skills. Caroline G. 
Trinkley, Note, Child Labor in America: An Historical Analysis, 13 IN PUB. INTEREST 59, 77–78 
(1993). Employers also argued that such labor was the only way employers could maintain ―their 
competitive edge.‖ Id. at 79. See also Michele D‘Avolio, Child Labor and Cultural Relativism: From 
19th Century America to 21st Century Nepal, 16 PACE INT‘L L. REV. 109, 116 (2004) (noting the fear 
among businesses that ―they would not be able to survive‖ if they had to hire adults and pay the 
corresponding higher wages).  
 27. CFCs have a relatively low boiling point and are ―essentially non-toxic, noncaustic, 
noncorrosive, and nonflammable,‖ which made them attractive for a number of commercial purposes. 
Jeffrey P. Cohn, Chlorofluorocarbons and the Ozone Layer, 37 BIOSCIENCE 647, 647 (1987). 
 28. See Nicholas A. Robinson, Legal Systems, Decisionmaking, and the Science of Earth’s 
Systems: Procedural Missing Links, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1077, 1118–19 (2001). 
 29. For more on international and domestic delays in regulating CFCs, see Orval E. Nangle, 
Stratospheric Ozone: United States Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
531 (1989).  
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Awareness of governance vacuums and related negative externalities 
associated with particular products does not necessarily lead to corrective 
regulation. Regulation can take many forms—norm-development, civil 
and/or criminal prohibition, fines, and so on—but I am going to focus on 
regulation through the establishment of property rights and markets.
30
 
Sometimes the cost of internalizing externalities through law, i.e., 
associating them with property rights, is greater than the cost of the 
harmful externalities themselves.
31
 Additionally, when the supply chain 
crosses national boundaries, a regulatory gap can be exploited by 
companies seeking to avoid countries with more stringent standards.
32
 
Even where there seems to be general agreement that the activity or 
activities should not be allowed to continue, delays in enacting and 
enforcing corrective laws ensure a lag time between recognition of the 
problem and effective prevention of the action(s) causing harm.
33
  
During ―the governance gap‖—the time between recognition of the 
problem and the problem being addressed—consumers face a dilemma. 
They can purchase the good, suspending their knowledge of the 
production externalities for the sake of consumption. Mentally reverting to 
the assumptions that production processes do not matter to consumers or 
that through price the market takes care of production problems, 
consumers can choose to disregard known externalities.
34
 Or they can 
 
 
 30. A focus on property-based regulation reflects the dominant—albeit arguably ―misplaced‖—
view regarding the regulation of externalities and fits well with the issue, offsetting, being addressed in 
this article. See generally Eleanor Weston Brown, A Common Morality: Toward a Framework for 
Designing Fiscal Instruments to Respond to Global Climate Change, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 391, 397–
400 (2010) (critiquing the dominance of law-and-economics-inspired market and privatization 
solutions to regulatory problems). 
 31. Costs include political costs. Problematically, powerful interest groups may succeed in 
blocking corrective regulation. The classic example is a monopoly, which can use market control to 
maintain high prices and block legal change. With the Supreme Court lifting caps on corporate 
campaign contributions and industry successfully pushing anti-consumer laws, scalar challenges are 
likely to increase. Such large entities can make the cost of change (at least for politicians) higher than 
the cost of the externalities. For more on the role powerful groups play in structuring institutions for 
their benefit, see JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992).  
 Additionally, in some instances these costs will be high because of the demanding requirements 
for privatization of open-access resources to solve the problem of externalities. Ideally, privatization 
will ensure ―each private property owner must bear the full social costs and benefits of her actions,‖ 
leaving ―no remaining externalities or spillover effects.‖ Sinden, supra note 10, at 557.  
 32. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in 
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 919–20 (2007) (discussing the challenges of addressing 
this regulatory gap).  
 33. Gary Libecap argues that assignment of property rights—internalization of externalities—as 
a solution to open-access problems typically occurs after a period of delay marked by unnecessary 
waste. Gary D. Libecap, Open-Access Losses and Delay in the Assignment of Property Rights, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 379, 380–82 (2008).  
 34. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lee D. Ross, Environmental Values and Behaviors: Strategies to 
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decide not to buy that particular product. The decision to boycott a 
particular product or service is not an easy one for many consumers who 
naturally question whether a single buyer can actually make a difference. 
Moreover, this choice, for the consumer who wanted that particular item, 
involves some self-sacrifice—suppressing their desires for the sake of 
preventing the known harm associated with the product.  
Consumer response to known governance vacuums and associated 
negative externalities seems limited to a single ―buy / don‘t buy‖ decision. 
As an either/or choice, consumers who want a particular product usually 
opt for consumption unless the harm is egregious and beyond dispute. 
Generally the market does not offer consumers other options besides buy 
or not. By limiting the options in this way, the market operates to foreclose 
other avenues for consumer voice when confronted with the dilemma 
posed by known production harms.
35
 Conceptualizing the role of the 
market during the governance gap is challenging. One could describe the 
continued sale of products at a price not reflecting the externalities of their 
production as an example of market failure.
36
 The failure takes place not in 
the store, but up the supply chain, where producers do not have to pay for 
external effects of production. Those who suffer the negative externalities 
do not have a property right to be free from such harm, nor the ability to 
sell such a right.
37
 Because there is no market for the externalities, goods 
come to market without that added cost, allowing the price to be lower 
than it would be without the market failure.  
 
 
Encourage Public Support for Initiatives to Combat Global Warming, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 168 
(2008) (―Individuals often adopt strategies of rational ignorance, or rather rational conservation, of 
time and attention.‖).  
 35. Consumers essentially have the options of loyalty and exit, but not voice. See ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
STATES (1970) (discussing these response categories). But see Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra 
note 7, at 610 (noting that ―process-distinguished goods‖ such as ―sweatshop-free clothing or cruelty-
free cosmetics‖ offer ―consumers a voice‖).  
 36. An extensive body of literature treats externalities in this way. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, 
The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-Market 
Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius 
Margolis eds., 1970); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 69–
70 (1996); Lloyd N. Cutler, Regulatory Mismatch and Its Cure, 96 HARV. L. REV. 545, 546–48 (1982) 
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982)) (summarizing Breyer‘s views on 
externalities and market failure).  
 According to an allocation theory definition of market failure, ―we mean the failure of a more or 
less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain ‗desirable‘ activities or to estop 
‗undesirable‘ activities.‖ Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 351 
(1958).  
 37. An individual with a right to clean air, for example, could charge a producer of a good for air 
pollution associated with production, but without that right, the ability to use another‘s clean air is an 
―unpaid factor‖ of the good‘s production. See Bator, supra note 36, at 364.  
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Perhaps a better way to characterize the continued sale of products 
during the governance gap is not as a market failure but as an institutional 
limitation. For while not pricing in externalities is a failure of the market 
to ensure consumers cover the full costs of production, those acting in the 
market—producers and consumers—are behaving exactly as hoped for in 
capitalist economies. Consumers are purchasing the products they want at 
the lowest price possible given competition and the applicable rules in 
place at the time. The market creates real value; both the value of lower 
prices and better products and the value consumers receive with the 
freedom to be market participants.
38
 What it fails to do—police production 
externalities or even make sure prices are correct—is not something it is 
currently tasked with doing. The market‘s institutional form makes the 
decision to purchase a take-it-or-leave-it decision at the moment of 
purchase rather than a range of options. However natural this seems 
because U.S. markets customarily take this form, this institutional 
limitation on consumer choice and voice is not a requirement for 
functioning markets.  
Consumers do not merely buy the end product; they also have indirect 
ownership over the process that created the product. If all I do is buy a pair 
of shoes produced through exploitation of workers or destruction of the 
environment, I am participating in the harm. But imagine if what was for 
sale was not merely the shoes, but a mechanism to offset the harm 
associated with my consumption. The take-it-or-leave-it institutional 
structure would be replaced by: (a) take it, (b) leave it, or (c) take and 
offset it. There are many practices that might be connected to particular 
products—unpaid employee overtime, sweatshops in developing countries 
with poor working conditions, and unregulated industrial pollution to 
name a few. With the additional institutional capability of an offset option, 
consumers can decide for themselves if they want to do something to 
correct for production practices they disapprove of or do not want 
associated with their purchase. Supplemental payments are not a perfect 
solution for any of these practices, but they are a step in the right direction 
compared to the norm of ignoring production processes when making 
purchasing decisions.  
 
 
 38. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
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II. RESPONSIBLE CONSUMPTION AND OFFSETTING 
The central characteristic of consumption offsetting is the making of a 
supplemental payment, above the market price of a good, to offset the 
harm associated with the production and consumption of that good. With 
―institutional offsetting,‖ the supplemental payment consists of a separate 
transaction, often paid to an independent organization. ―Quasi offsetting,‖ 
in contrast, describes the situation where the supplemental payment is 
integrated in some way into the good itself and reflected in the final price. 
There are far more examples of quasi offsetting, but precisely because the 
price includes the supplement, it is harder to isolate the offsetting element. 
Institutional offsetting, in contrast, makes the supplemental payment 
amount readily apparent, but because this type is in a nascent stage, these 
offsetting options are fractionated and the related institutions of this more 
pure or true form of offsetting are not fully developed.  
The partial nature of quasi offsetting draws attention to a gap between 
budding consumer interest in correcting for consumption harms and the 
level of institutional support to facilitate action by consumers with this 
desire. With institutional offsetting, consumer offsetting does not depend 
on the voluntary actions of producers—offsetting payments can be made 
to third-party providers without the producer even knowing about such a 
payment. In contrast, while quasi offsetting ideally involves a mutual 
decision by consumers and producers, more likely the level of corporate 
social responsibility or reduction in externalities reflects policies 
determined primarily by producers. Producers are selling a packaged good 
made up of social responsibility and their product.
39
 Quasi offsetting, by 
expanding the options from the single buy / don‘t buy decision to include a 
third option of buying this packaged good, starts to offer consumers a 
limited space not merely for exit and loyalty but for voice. Institutional 
offsetting liberates and amplifies such voice by allowing consumers to 
make payments independent of the packaging choices of producers.  
In this Part, I argue for thickening the institutions and practices 
associated with consumption offsetting. Part II.A explores quasi offsetting, 
using a range of examples. From cases where it is unclear that a 
supplemental payment is being made to practices where companies more 
explicitly identify their products with supplemental payments, quasi 
offsetting examples abound. The purpose of discussing quasi offsetting is 
not to equate such haphazard practices with institutional offsetting but to 
 
 
 39. For product and social responsibility examples, see infra Part II.A.  
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provide a broader perspective on the preferences of consumers and the 
related potential for improving on offsetting institutions. Shifting gears to 
the heart of this article, Part II.B covers the origins and institutions of 
environmental offsetting. Attention to global warming and the increasing 
importance of economic approaches to the environment have pushed 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions offsetting to the forefront of institutional 
offsetting. The prescriptive core of the Article, drawing upon the rise and 
lessons of environmental offsetting, is developed in Part II.C. I argue for 
extending the practice and institution of environmental offsetting to other 
social harms, particularly consumption-related poverty. The foundational 
idea behind both environmental and poverty offsetting is the recognition 
that through offset payments individuals can correct for or reduce the 
negative externalities often associated with production and consumption.  
A. Quasi Offsetting 
Quasi offsetting can be thought of as a particular form of socially 
responsible consumption. The two are not equivalent, however, because 
offsetting necessarily involves supplemental expenditure while socially 
responsible consumption may not. Critical to offsetting is a choice to pay 
more, not because of the nature of the product itself, but out of a desire to 
correct for consumption. There is, of course, room for substantial overlap: 
a company whose products appeal to buyers who self-identify as socially 
responsible may also market an offset tied to their products. With socially 
responsible consumption becoming increasingly the expectation in some 
circles, the range of products marketed as socially responsible, and often 
with an integrated offset, is exploding.  
Observing the supplemental payment with quasi offsetting requires 
comparing the price of the good with the price of substitute goods that do 
not have the particular built-in offset. Where the two products being 
compared are the same but one costs more because of the offset, 
identifying the supplemental amount associated with the offset is easy.
40
 
 
 
 40. Compare the price, for example, of regular, extra large eggs with the price of cage free, extra 
large eggs. Consumers are willing to pay up to twice as much to buy eggs not associated with caged 
chickens. See Dan Eggen, Egg Industry Alarmed About Efforts to Limit Cage Sizes, WASH. POST, Sept. 
6, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/03/AR20100 
90302455.html. Similarly, the supplemental amount is easily identified in the practice of some utility 
companies to offer ―premium-priced, green-energy‖ programs, giving customers the choice of paying 
one amount for normally produced (dirty) energy and a higher amount for clean energy. Matthew J. 
Kotchen & Michael R. Moore, Conservation: From Voluntary Restraint to a Voluntary Price 
Premium, 40 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 195, 196 (2008). As another article observed of such 
programs, ―customers are faced with the option of paying a price premium for green electricity or a 
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When the goods being compared are imperfect substitutes, it is impossible 
to say with certainty how much of the purchase price can be attributed to 
consumers‘ desires to offset versus that attributable to qualitative 
differences in the goods. Though an exact calculation of the supplemental 
payment amount in particular products is not necessarily possible, the key 
insight for our purposes is the recognition that quasi offsetting is a 
common aspect of consumption behavior.  
Offsetting integrated into particular products is likely to be partial 
offsetting at best. Quasi offsetting options may be preferable to the 
standard consumption practice of indifference to consumption 
externalities, but many of these options merely reduce the level of 
associated harm. Such reductions are a net positive if the baseline includes 
standard consumption practices but still are harmful if the baseline is pre-
consumption. When offsetting levels and degree of social responsibility is 
determined by the producer, consumer interest in reducing consumption 
harm may not align with the profit interest of producers. Consumers who 
hope for a one-to-one level of offsetting are unlikely to have this desire 
satisfied by producers. The incentives for producers are all wrong: 
producers do not want to call attention to the harms of buying their 
products. Even if harm associated with a particular form of consumption is 
generally acknowledged, the profit-motive will drive producers to claim to 
have corrected for, or sufficiently reduced, the associated harm. 
Companies that internalize all production externalities or, alternatively, 
pay to fully offset such harms will have to charge more for their products. 
As the case studies of quasi offsetting in this Part—(1) social awareness 
and cause marketing, (2) hybrid vehicles, and (3) fair trade and production 
certifications—show, quasi offsetting generally does not fully correct for 
production and consumption harms.  
The case studies that follow explore the edges of offsetting. As such, 
the three case studies of quasi offsetting invite debate about whether they 
are examples of offsetting or merely examples of differentiated products or 
practices. My purpose in exploring these cases is not to reach definitive 
conclusions for these categories but to highlight underappreciated and 
under-theorized practices that collectively root offsetting in larger market 
phenomena. Moving from the edge of offsetting to the institutionalization 
of offsetting requires replacing the ad hoc forms of quasi offsetting evident 
 
 
guilt premium for dirty electricity.‖ Joshua S. Gans & Vivienne Groves, Carbon Offset Provision with 
Guilt-Ridden Consumers 4 (Aug. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=969494.  
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in these case studies with expanded options that more closely parallel 
those being offered in the field of environmental consumption.  
1. Corporate Responsibility and Cause Marketing  
Nowadays you often are not just consuming, you are buying into 
causes at the same time. You buy a bucket of chicken from KFC and you 
are supporting Susan G. Komen for the Cure, a breast cancer charity.
41
 By 
drinking Pepsi while at KFC, you support everything from the clean up of 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico to City Year, a 
national service organization.
42
 If you pay for your meal with a new 
Starbucks credit card, Starbucks will make a $5 donation to Jumpstart, a 
children‘s tutoring program.43 If instead you pay with a new Nature 
Conservancy credit card, Bank of America will plant ten trees.
44
 And the 
opposite is true as well. With certain purchases you become, rightly or 
wrongly, branded by association as being anti-gay rights (eating Domino‘s 
Pizza), anti-environment (driving an SUV), opposed to a living wage 
(shopping at Wal-Mart), and so on.
45
  
Companies have discovered that their bottom line depends in part on 
convincing customers that they are good corporate citizens or that 
consumers can support a larger cause by buying their products.
46
 American 
 
 
 41. See KFC Presents to Susan G. Komen for the Cure® a Check for more than $4.2 Million: 
Single Largest Donation in Organization’s History, SUSAN G. KOMEN FOR THE CURE, 
http://ww5.komen.org/KomenNewsArticle.aspx?id=6442452377&terms=kfc (last visited Aug. 26, 
2011); see also Joe Waters, Komen’s Cause Marketing Program Isn’t “Finger-Lickin’ Good‖, SELFISH 
GIVING (Apr. 20, 2010), http://selfishgiving.com/causerants/komens-cause-marketing-program-isnt-
fingerlickin-good.  
 42. See Funded Ideas, PEPSI REFRESH PROJECT, http://www.refresheverything.com/grant-
recipients (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 43. See Starbucks: A New Twist on Affinity Credit Cards, CAUSE MARKETING FORUM, 
http://ww2.causemarketingforum.com/page.asp?ID=205 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 44. See Working with Companies, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/joinand 
donate/corporatepartnerships/tnccard (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 45. For more examples of products combining philanthropy and consumption, see Patricia M. 
Nickel & Angela M. Eikenberry, A Critique of the Discourse of Marketized Philanthropy, 52 AM. 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 974, 978–79 (2009).  
 46. Interestingly, companies may also need to convince investors: corporate social responsibility 
may positively impact analysts‘ investment recommendations for publicly traded companies. See 
Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Investment 
Recommendations (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-017, 2010), available at http://www. 
hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-017.pdf. Investors can choose to invest in ―good‖ companies or, in the 
expectation that a company is vulnerable to protests or boycotts based on ―bad‖ behavior, they can 
short companies that do not take their corporate social responsibilities seriously. See Douglas A. 
Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2153 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance] (discussing a hedge 
fund that selects companies to short based on their environmental and social practices).  
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consumers, or at least certain segments of the consuming public, prefer to 
buy goods from companies they believe are good actors, based on 
environmental records, labor practices, or other metrics.
47
 As a result, 
companies zealously create and guard their brand‘s image against bad 
publicity. They also try to associate the brand and particular products with 
charities or the common good. By partnering with charitable 
organizations, especially those with broad appeal, companies hope 
consumers will mentally link the company with the charity, carrying over 
the goodwill they have for the charity to how they feel about the 
company.
48
  
It is important to distinguish these two corporate practices. Corporate 
responsibility for internal practices involves, among other things, a 
company doing its best to minimize externalities and serve the larger 
community. Cause marketing, in contrast, involves companies partnering 
with external charities, which while it can be one aspect of corporate 
responsibility, is different in kind. Though at times companies deliberately 
blur the line between corporate responsibility and cause marketing—
Newman‘s Own, for example, donates all of its profits to charity49—the 
two are not offsetting equivalents.  
The added expense of corporate responsibility can perhaps best be seen 
in examples of companies falling short of public expectations. In response 
to media reports of worker abuse at factories overseas, Nike established 
internal and external auditing procedures for its supply chain.
50
 Although 
critics charge Nike with making largely symbolic or cosmetic changes, 
that Nike felt compelled to respond attests to the importance of consumer 
perception of corporate social responsibility.
51
 Consumers may be wrong 
 
 
 47. See, e.g., Robert B. White, Note, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform 
Federal Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 325, 325 (2010) (―Surveys . . . have consistently found 
that most consumers are more likely to choose products that claim to be environmentally friendly over 
products that do not make such a claim.‖).  
 48. Cf. Terri Lynn, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 886, 
888 (2010). This mental linking has been called the ―halo effect‖ to describe how individuals use 
limited information about corporate social responsibility at a particular company to attribute positive 
assumptions about the company, even for uncorrelated behavioral categories. See N. Craig Smith, 
Daniel Read & Sofía López-Rodríguez, Consumer Perceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
The CSR Halo Effect (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2010/16/ISIC, 2010).  
 49. See $300 Million for the Common Good, NEWMAN‘S OWN, http://www.newmansown.com/ 
commongood.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 50. See Workers & Factories: Improving Conditions in Our Contract Factories., NIKEBIZ, 
http://www.nikebiz.com/responsibility/workers_and_factories.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). Other 
companies have established ―praiseworthy‖ audit and enforcement processes. Jessica Karbowski, 
Note, Grocery Store Activism: A WTO Compliant Means to Incentivize Social Responsibility, 49 VA. J. 
INT‘L L. 727, 741 (2009) (citing Levi-Strauss).  
 51. See Jim Keady, When Will Nike “Just Do It” On the Sweatshop Issue?, THE HUFFINGTON 
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about which companies are more socially responsible; nevertheless, public 
expectations of corporate behavior can impose added expense.
52
 As a 
result, companies that take corporate responsibility seriously may have to 
charge a higher price for their products than that charged by competitors.  
Companies such as Ben & Jerry‘s exemplify the heightened level of 
corporate social responsibility that arguably rises to the level of quasi 
offsetting. Ben & Jerry‘s mission statement commits the company to 
―improve the quality of life locally, nationally and internationally,‖ to use 
―business practices that respect the Earth and the Environment,‖ and to 
expand ―opportunities for development and career growth‖ for company 
employees.
53
 In line with the mission statement, among other things, Ben 
& Jerry‘s pays its employees a living wage54 and uses special non-global-
warming refrigerators.
55
 The company came up with its Rain Forest 
Crunch flavor of ice cream as a way to funnel money to indigenous people 
harvesting Brazil nuts and also prevent deforestation. The marketing 
director of Cultural Survival—an indigenous rights group that helped Ben 
& Jerry‘s with the idea—explained to National Public Radio, ―What we 
want to do is let Americans do what they do best—consume. We want to 
show them a way that‘s actually going to help somebody and that is not 
going to be totally self-centered as it has been in the past.‖56 Not 
 
 
POST (Oct. 2, 2009, 8:58PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-keady/when-will-nike-just-do-it_ 
b_308448.html. Even an op-ed critiquing the idea of corporate social responsibility acknowledges the 
importance of consumer expectations: ―The only sure way to influence corporate decision making is to 
impose an unacceptable cost—regulatory mandates, taxes, punitive fines, public embarrassment—on 
socially unacceptable behavior.‖ Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010 (emphasis added), available at http://online. wsj.com/article/SB10001 
424052748703338004575230112664504890.html.  
 52. Such expectations, besides adding expense, also suggest that people think that companies 
should do more than just increase shareholder value. MAX ANDERSON & PETER ESCHER, THE MBA 
OATH: SETTING A HIGHER STANDARD FOR BUSINESS LEADERS 75 (2010) (arguing, based on poll 
results, that ―most people expect more of business than the law demands‖ and that the majority of 
people ―want companies to go beyond their historical role of making a profit‖). See also Henry 
Mintzberg, Robert Simons & Kunal Basu, Beyond Selfishness, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 67, 67–68 
(2002) (arguing against a narrow focus on profits and in favor of corporate recognition of social 
responsibility); Aron Cramer, WSJ Takes Aim at . . . Corporate Responsibility?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 23, 2010, 10:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aron-cramer/wsj-takes-aim-atcorporate 
_b_692003.html (same). But see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).  
 53. Ben & Jerry’s Mission, BEN & JERRY‘S, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/mission-
statement (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 54. See Livable Wage, BEN & JERRY‘S, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/peace-and-justice/ 
livable-wage (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (noting that this is nearly twice the minimum wage).  
 55. See Hydrocarbon○The New Cool!, BEN & JERRY‘S, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/ 
environmental/hc-freezer (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 56. Weekend Edition: Vanishing Homelands: “Rainforest Crunch” (NPR radio broadcast July 
26, 1992) (quoting Jason Clay of Cultural Survival).  
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surprisingly, Ben & Jerry‘s ice cream is not cheap, with customers in part 
supporting the company‘s expansive mission.  
Similarly, SunChips is selling a combination of environmental 
corporate responsibility and ―healthy‖ whole-grain chips.57 
Advertisements for SunChips proclaim: ―Nurture Nature,‖ ―Who‘s 
Hungry for Change?‖ and ―There Are Many Ways to Help the Planet. 
Harvest Cheddar Is One.‖58 The smaller print explains that SunChips‘ bags 
are now made from plants and are fully compostable.
59
 The company also 
insists that its investment in solar power and a related ad campaign are not 
examples of ―greenwashing.‖60 Again, consumers are purchasing both a 
product and the company‘s environmental policies.61  
Does the purchase of goods from a company that goes beyond 
corporate social responsibility norms amount to an offset? Being 
responsible—to workers, the environment, etc.—often adds to production 
expenses and can be reflected in the good‘s price.62 The Knights Apparel 
Company, for example, has decided to open a factory in the Dominican 
Republic that pays a living wage, three times the country‘s minimum 
 
 
 57. The same can be said of many other companies; Patagonia, an outdoor clothing and 
equipment company, for example, has similarly ―used its efforts to reduce its carbon footprint to 
distinguish itself from competitors.‖ Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Captain Planet Takes on Hazard 
Transfer: Combining the Forces of Market, Legal and Ethical Decisionmaking to Reduce Toxic 
Exports, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 71, 80 (2009) 
 58. SUNCHIPS, http://www.sunchips.com/healthier_planet.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). 
 59. For more on the SunChips‘ bags, see Kate Galbraith, A Compostable Chips Bag Hits the 
Shelves, NYTIMES.COM BLOG: GREEN (Mar. 16, 2010, 10:45 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/03/16/a-compostable-chips-bag-hits-the-shelves; Our Compostable Bag is Still Here, SUNCHIPS, 
http://www.sunchips.com/healthier_planet.shtml?s=content_compostable_packaging (last visited Aug. 
26, 2011).  
 60. Stuart Elliot, Trumpeting a Move to Put the Sun in SunChips, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/media/27adco.html.  
 61. The challenge involved for companies can be seen in the flip-flopping of Frito-Lay. In 
October 2010, Frito-Lay announced it was discontinuing its use of biodegradable bags for the 
SunChips line because of customer complaints that the bags were too loud compared with standard 
bags. See Kate Sheppard, Why We’re Doomed, MOTHER JONES BLOG: BLUE MARBLE (Oct. 5, 2010, 
10:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2010/10/snack-attack-sunchips-cans-eco-bag. But the 
bag is back, as the company‘s website explains, ―We‘re all about making delicious snacks that are 
better for you and the environment . . . People raved about the chips, but thought the bag was a little 
noisy. Well, we heard you. We‘ve created a new, quieter, fully compostable chip bag that‘s easy on the 
ears.‖ Our Compostable Bag Is Still Here, SUNCHIPS, http://www.sunchips.com/healthier_planet. 
shtml?s=content_compostable_packaging (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 62. A Heritage Foundation memo provocatively suggests that ―corporations should voluntarily 
adopt disclosure standards similar to those used for nutrition labeling—prices for their products could 
be broken down to show consumers how much above world price they are paying to subsidize CSR 
[Corporate Social Responsibility] activities.‖ James M. Roberts, “Socially Responsible” 
Corporations: Whose Wealth Are They Spreading Around?, HERITAGE FOUNDATION WEBMEMO, NO. 
2720, at 3 (Dec. 4, 2009), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/wm2720.pdf.  
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wage.
63
 It remains to be seen, however, ―whether students, alumni and 
sports fans will be willing to pay $18 for the factory‘s T-shirts—the same 
as premium brands like Nike and Adidas—to sustain the plant and its 
generous wages.‖64 United Students Against Sweatshops, a student activist 
group that deserves much of the credit for focusing attention on collegiate 
apparel, hopes that ―educational institutions can become critical mass ‗no-
sweat‘ consumers.‖65 Similarly, if consumers are not willing to pay the 
extra amount for a SunChips brand chip, they end up polluting the earth 
with a non-compostable bag. They could offset this externality of 
consumption by making a supplemental payment to an environmental 
organization, or they could simply avoid the harm in the first place by 
paying more for a SunChips brand chip.
66
 What if the company changes its 
practices to become more environmentally friendly and ends up saving 
production costs?
67
 Environmentally-conscious consumers could pick the 
more responsible company and pay less than they would if they bought 
from a competitor. There would be no supplemental offset payment but 
they would have avoided consumption-related harm.  
The case for cause marketing as quasi offsetting is stronger than that 
for corporate responsibility. American Express, with a campaign linking 
credit card usage and new card applications with donations towards the 
bicentennial restoration of the Statue of Liberty, is credited with inventing 
the term ―cause-related marketing‖ and demonstrating its business value.68 
Since then, companies have increasingly linked consumption of their good 
 
 
 63. Steven Greenhouse, Factory Defies Sweatshop Label, but Can It Thrive?, N.Y. TIMES, July 
17, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/global/18shirt.html.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Michele Micheletti & Dietlind Stolle, Mobilizing Consumers to Take Responsibility for 
Global Social Justice, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 167 (2007).  
 66. In some contexts, economies of scale in delivering a social good may make it more efficient 
to pay more directly to a firm practicing corporate social responsibility than to make a side payment to 
a charity. See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 
2063 (2007).  
 67. See DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES 
USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE 10–12 (2006) (giving reasons companies could save money); Roberts, supra note 3, at 9 
(noting that the corporate social responsibility programs of firms generally involve ―seeking a win-win 
situation,‖ such as ―increas[ing] efficiency and firm profits . . . by reducing costs and waste‖); Sindya 
N. Bhanoo, Products That Are Earth-and-Profit Friendly, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/business/energy-environment/12sustain.html (providing examples 
of corporations embracing green efficiency).  
 68. CONE LLC, PAST. PRESENT. FUTURE. THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF CAUSE MARKETING 2 
(2008), available at http://www.coneinc.com/news/request.php?id=1187. American Express enjoyed a 
28% increase in card usage the year of the campaign compared to the preceding year. Lynn, supra note 
48, at 935.  
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or service with charities or other worthy causes in the hopes that such 
connections will lead consumers to choose their brand.
69
 Whether the 
company promises to make a charitable payment automatically or in return 
for customers demonstrating brand loyalty,
70
 cause marketing makes doing 
good easy.
71
 All people have to do is shop!  
A recent print ad campaign that appeared in major magazines featured 
an attractive woman walking through a park, her arms laden down with 
Target shopping bags. But the ad was not about the products in the bags, it 
was about Target‘s support of education, social services, and the arts.72 
The ad proclaimed in bold print that, because Target gives away 5 percent 
of the company‘s income, the shopper was a ―Do Gooder‖!73 The cause 
ironically is Target itself, with customers asked to trust that the company‘s 
charitable giving choices reflect their own. The message: it is good to shop 
at Target.  
The (RED) campaign, spearheaded by Bobby Shriver and Bono, 
channels money from purchases of products with the (RED) logo to The 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
74
 (RED) produces 
nothing, but pairs with a whole range of companies, including Nike, GAP, 
Apple, and Starbucks, to sell special products that have ―(RED)‖ printed 
on them. In return for essentially licensing the logo, the partner company 
agrees to send 50 percent of the profit on the good sold to the Global 
Fund. See Figure 1 below: 
 
 
 69. See Michael Jay Polonsky & Greg Wood, Can the Overcommercialization of Cause-Related 
Marketing Harm Society?, 21 J. MACROMARKETING 8, 11–12 (2001) (giving an overview of cause 
marketing with product/charity examples); Michal Strahilevitz, The Effects of Product Type and 
Donation Magnitude on Willingness to Pay More for a Charity-Linked Brand, 8 J. CONSUMER 
PSYCHOL. 215, 216 (1999) (detailing the impacts of the increase in cause-related marketing). 
 70. Susan G. Komen for the Cure, for example, receives 10 cents from every Yoplait yogurt lid 
mailed in by consumers as part of the company‘s ―Yoplait Save Lids to Save Lives‖ campaign. David 
Hessekiel, The Most Influential Cause Marketing Campaigns, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 10, 2010, 
available at http://adage.com/article/goodworks/influential-marketing-campaigns/142037. See also 
Save Lids to Save Lives, YOPLAIT, http://www.yoplait.com/slsl (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 71. Some charities support these programs because they ―make it easier for people to donate 
because the transaction occurs as they go about their everyday business.‖ Stephanie Strom, Charity’s 
Share from Shopping Raises Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007 [hereinafter Strom, Charity’s 
Share], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/13/us/13giving.html?ref=philanthropy. But see 
Angela M. Eikenberry, The Hidden Costs of Cause Marketing, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., 
Summer 2009, at 51, 53 (arguing that consumption philanthropy ―is too easy‖ and ―does not allow 
people to exercise their moral core‖).  
 72. See TARGET COMMUNITY OUTREACH WEBPAGE, http://sites.target.com/site/en/corporate/ 
page.jsp?contentId=PRD03-001811 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 73. See id.  
 74. See The (RED) Idea, (RED) CAMPAIGN, http://www.joinred.com/aboutred (last visited Aug. 
26, 2011). For more on the Global Fund, see THE GLOBAL FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
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FIGURE 1: (RED) CAUSE MARKETING
75
  
 
1. A shopper  
notes that the Gap 
(PRODUCT)REDTM 
apparel cost the same 
as other Gap apparel.  
But choosing the (RED) 
clothes means 50%  
of Gap’s profits will 
go to help eliminate 
AIDS in Africa.
 
2. Shopper buys the 
Gap (PRODUCT)RED 
apparel. Gap sends 
a contribution of 50% 
of profits directly to 
The Global Fund— 
not to (RED). 
3. The Global Fund 
uses 100% of this 
money to finance 
HIV health and  
community support 
programs in Africa, 
with a focus on  
women and children. 
4. The contribution 
helps a person affected 
by HIV in Ghana, 
Swaziland, Rwanda, 
Lesotho, Zambia, 
South Africa and 
other countries to be 
granted (RED) money 
in the future. 
5. THE RESULT? 
Shopper has some new 
Gap (PRODUCT)RED 
clothes and helped  
save a person’s life. 
And, they can continue 
to help when they shoose 
(RED) the next time they shop 
or they can get INSPI(RED) 
to donate more money  
directly to the Global Fund at 
www.theglobalfund.org/en/donate/. 
In four years, the (RED) campaign has raised $170 million dollars for 
The Global Fund,
76
 largely on the strength of (RED) tagged product sales 
many times that amount.
77
 In the three years preceding the (RED) 
campaign, total private donations to The Global Fund had only been $5 
million.
78
 The (RED) campaign is not without its detractors. For example, 
buylesscrap.org proclaims:  
SHOPPING IS NOT A SOLUTION 
 Buy (Less). Give More.  
 Join us in rejecting the ti(red) notion that shopping is a 
reasonable response to human suffering.  
 
 
 75. Image taken from How (RED) Works, (RED) CAMPAIGN, http://www.joinred.com/ 
aboutred/about_red (click on How (Red) Works) (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). Despite the 
attractiveness of this simplified model, in a great article, Sarah Dadush notes that the (RED) campaign 
was not being transparent about its finances or about the existence of another entity—an LLC tasked 
with brand development—that also was paid by partner companies. Sarah Dadush, Profiting in (RED): 
The Need for Enhanced Transparency in Cause-Related Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 
1269, 1271–74 (2010). See also Andrew F. Cooper, Beyond Hollywood and the Boardroom: Celebrity 
Diplomacy, 8 GEO. J. INT‘L AFF. 125, 130 (2007) (noting controversies involving (RED)‘s 
transparency).  
 76. (RED) CAMPAIGN, http://www.joinred.com/red/# (click on The Latest (RED) Results) (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 77. But see Dadush, supra note 75, at 1295 (noting $42 million of the total was raised in a single 
night at an art auction, not through product sales). 
 78. Id. at 1271. 
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 We invite you to donate directly to the (RED) campaign‘s 
beneficiary The Global Fund and to these other charitable causes 
. . . without consuming.
79
 
The differing perspectives on the (RED) campaign attest to the 
challenge of categorizing and conceptualizing cause marketing.  
According to the (RED) campaign, and a view implicitly shared by all 
companies with a cause marketing connection to charities, cause 
marketing allows consumers to support worthy causes without cost. The 
rosy view of cause marketing asserts that the purchase price is market-
determined and that through cause marketing the consumer converts some 
of that amount into a charitable donation.
80
 A realist perspective 
recognizes that companies are going to make up for the cause marketing‘s 
added expense—of donating 50 percent of the profits in the case of the 
(RED) campaign or 5 percent of income in the case of Target—in one way 
or another.
81
 If the cause marketing tie-in is successful enough, added sales 
might enable the company to make more money supporting the cause than 
not, even without raising product prices. But equally likely, the 
contribution to the cause is supported by higher prices (either for that 
particular product or for another of the company‘s products). Companies, 
in effect, are facilitating a charitable payment made by the consumer or if 
not by the consumer, then by shareholders.
82
  
 
 
 79. BUY (LESS), http://www.buylesscrap.org (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (ellipsis in original). 
Another similar website, www.whatididnotbuy.org, invites people to donate the amount they would 
have spent on consumption directly to a global non-profit‘s poverty empowerment programs. See 
WHAT I DID NOT BUY, http://whatididnotbuy.org (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). See also Stephanie 
Strom, Site Diverts Shopping Money to Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/technology/internet/13charity.html.  
 80. (RED)‘s promise to consumers is that they do not have to pay more to give money to a 
worthy charity:  
In fact, we have a ―free‖ opportunity to save lives and change the world—we would buy 
shirts or shoes anyway, why not help at the same time? Coupled with the fact that (RED) 
appeals to our sense of morality and our wish to feel good about ourselves and our choices, it 
also appeals to a desire to make a difference without having to spend extra time or money. 
Perhaps anticipating complaints that we do not have the money to give more to charity or that 
we do not have time to save the world, (RED) assures us that it does not cost anything to save 
lives. 
Norma Anderson, Shoppers of the World Unite: (RED)’s Messaging and Morality in the Fight against 
African AIDS, 2 J. PAN AFR. STUD. 32, 41 (2008). 
 81. Notably, in 2007, an advertising trade publication, Ad Age, ―blasted‖ (RED), and indirectly 
(RED) partners who provided the advertising, ―for having spent $100 million on advertising and 
raising less than a fifth of that amount, $18 million, for the Global Fund.‖ Dadush, supra note 75, at 
1279–80.  
 82. The (RED) campaign asserts that by purchasing (RED) products, consumers are not making a 
charitable donation, simply facilitating one, but such ―distinctions may not be conceptually or 
emotionally obvious to the average consumer.‖ Dadush, supra note 75, at 1291. The issue of who is 
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2011] SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 53 
 
 
 
 
Is cause marketing an example of quasi offsetting? While a definite 
answer is impossible given the variety of practices that fall under the 
category‘s ambit, cause marketing can be thought of as involving a split 
purchase by consumers: one amount paid for the product or service, 
another (usually much smaller) amount paid to the associated charity. This 
would seem to satisfy the supplemental payment aspect of offsetting. 
Additionally, although not necessarily the case, there is often a connection 
between the product being sold and the associated charity, which adds to 
the idea that cause marketing is a form of offsetting.  
But if it is offsetting, cause marketing seems somehow ―unclean‖ and 
perhaps incomplete. Companies are using cause marketing to make a 
profit off of consumer sentiment towards particular charities.
83
 Although 
some scholars have argued that corporate motives do not matter, only the 
resulting social benefits do,
84
 such an argument does not seem to reflect 
consumer unease. Moreover, companies, rather than customers, determine 
the charities to be paid and define the terms of payments to offset 
consumption by customers, rather than the amount of the payment and the 
recipient of the payment being based upon consumers‘ understandings of 
how much they should pay, and towards what cause, to offset their 
consumption. Customers may also purchase goods without intending to 
offset their consumption; they may simply be consuming the product 
because they like it. Ben & Jerry‘s may be their favorite ice cream, Target 
their favorite store, and they may like having the (RED) logo on their GAP 
shirts without caring about whether The Global Fund gets money from 
their purchase. This is not to deny that cause marketing can bring charities 
needed funding or that it can make some consumers give more, albeit 
indirectly, to charity than they would have otherwise. But characterizing 
cause marketing, much less corporate responsibility, as quasi offsetting is 
problematic.  
 
 
paying for the donation made through embedded giving forces the question, ―Are these ‗donations‘ 
add-ons to the price of the product—or a voluntary ‗charitable tax‘?‖ Paul Riede, Embedded Giving: 
Manufacturers Promise Charitable Donations; Do They Always Deliver?, SYRACUSE.COM: OPINION 
BLOG (Dec. 23, 2007, 5:02 AM), http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2007/12/embedded_giving_manu 
facturers.html.  
 83. Lisa Fairfax explained, ―[T]here is always the cynical charge that corporate social 
responsibility is little more than a public relations ploy to curry favor.‖ Lisa Fairfax, American Express 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 9, 2010, 6:56AM), http://www. 
concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/03/american-express-and-corporate-social-responsibility.html.  
 84. See, e.g., Malani & Posner, supra note 66, at 2064. 
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2. Hybrid Vehicles 
Given the role hybrid vehicles play in popular understandings of 
offsetting, it is worth exploring this single product type. Although the 
Toyota Prius has become the symbol of hybrid vehicles and demonstrated 
consumer willingness-to-pay for hybrid technology, most car companies 
now sell hybrids and there are even hybrid SUVs.
85
 By combining an 
electric motor with a standard gas motor, hybrids offer superior gas 
mileage to equivalent conventional gas engines. The rise of hybrids 
parallels a rising awareness of the problem of global warming and 
greenhouse gases. Hollywood celebrities were early adopters—as the 
celebrities arriving at events substituted the Prius for limousines—but the 
hybrid has become a vehicle of choice for the socially conscious upper 
middle class.
86
  
When consumers buy a hybrid, they pay more up front than they would 
for a ―normal‖ vehicle, even given government subsidies tied to fuel 
efficiency. With high enough gas prices, hybrids could save consumers 
money in the long run because of their improved fuel efficiency, but 
generally buyers pay more over the life of the car.
87
 Consumers pay for the 
gas-electric engine, the hybrid logo that, for some, says ―responsible 
consumer,‖ and what Motor Trend magazine calls ―the warm fuzzies.‖88 
Hybrid owners may experience the warm fuzzies even if the vehicle they 
purchased has little to no fuel efficiency or environmental impact 
improvements over other vehicle options. The Prius has an impressive 
estimated 51 city/48 highway mpg engine,
89
 but the hybrid category also 
 
 
 85. The eerily, ―suspiciously,‖ similar silhouette of the 2010 Honda Insight to the Toyota Prius 
attests to the market leading position of the Toyota. Edward Loh, Your Mileage May Vary: Honda’s 
All-New Hybrid is Great, Green Fun. Just Don’t Call it a Prius, MOTOR TREND MAG., Mar. 2009, 
available at http://automobiles.honda.com/images/2010/insight-hybrid/downloads/motor_trend.pdf. 
Despite the rise in alternatives, non-Prius hybrids may not give drivers ―who want to signal their green 
credentials‖ the same amount of happiness because they do not announce their hybrid nature to the 
same degree as a Prius. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 192 (2008)  
 86. Tellingly, even while the automotive industry was suffering through the current economic 
downturn in summer 2009, Toyota‘s Prius plants and Prius component suppliers were operating 
around the clock to keep up with global demand for Toyota‘s third-best-selling car. Hiroko Tabuchi, 
Industry Slumps, but Prius Inspires Waiting List, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/06/13/business/global/13prius.html?_r=2.  
 87. See Rhode & Ross, supra note 34, at 178–79 (―[S]ome [California hybrid] owners connected 
their choice to messages of frugality and intelligent consumerism, although none broke even finacially 
[sic] because of the steep purchase price that offset any fuel savings.‖).  
 88. Loh, supra note 85 (describing the ―warm fuzzies‖ drivers feel when they see dash displays 
on battery usage as ―what conspicuous hybrid motoring is all about‖).  
 89. TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.com/prius-hybrid/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
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includes the full-size GMC Yukon SUV, suburban two-wheel drive 
edition, with an estimated 21/22 mpg.
90
 The Lexus LS sedan‘s gas mileage 
is 16/24 mpg while the Lexus LS Hybrid sedan‘s gas mileage is 20/22 
mpg, actually worse on the highway than Lexus‘ conventional luxury 
car.
91
 What do consumers get for an extra $40,000 and a hybrid engine? 
The hybrid logo and a lot more horsepower.
92
 For those truly concerned 
about their carbon footprint, buying a used car arguably can be more 
environmentally conscious than buying a new hybrid, even a Prius.
93
 But a 
used car does not fit the costly, highly-visible, environmentalism offered 
by hybrids.
94
  
The argument that hybrid vehicles are an example of quasi offsetting 
requires that we imagine a new car buyer with two options. The person 
could buy a 2011 Toyota Corolla for approximately $17,460 or a 2011 
Toyota Prius for $24,280.
95
 Unless gas prices dramatically change, the 
added fuel economy of the Prius will not make up for its higher initial cost 
as far as overall cost of ownership. A buyer who wants to offset the carbon 
emissions of driving can pay a third-party offsetting institution based on 
the amount of fuel consumed. As there is still a need to offset the fuel 
 
 
 90. GMC, http://www.gmc.com/yukonhybrid/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 91. Compare LEXUS, http://www.lexus.com/models/LSh/detailed_specifications.html (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2011) with LEXUS, http://www.lexus.com/models/LS/detailed_specifications.html 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 92. Compare LEXUS, http://www.lexus.com/models/LSh/detailed_specifications.html (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2011) with LEXUS, http://www.lexus.com/models/LS/detailed_specifications.html 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 93. An op-ed in TheAtlantic.com‘s The Current elaborates on this point:  
Consider the eco-conscious automobile par excellence, the Toyota Prius. As it turns out, 
manufacturing the Prius‘s battery is extraordinarily carbon-intensive. Paying off this carbon 
debt through fuel savings will take 46,000 miles, according to Wired. Only after 100,000 
miles would the Prius catch up with the carbon savings offered by a ten-year-old Toyota 
Tercel. And the Prius would never catch up with a 1994 Geo Metro XFi. 
Reihan Salam, Life on Planet Green, THEATLANTIC.COM: THE CURRENT (June 9, 2008), 
http://thecurrent.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/06/life-on-planet-green.php. For more on the 
calculations behind the carbon debt, see Chuck Squatriglia, Go Green—Buy a Used Car. It’s Better 
Than a Hybrid, WIRED MAG.: AUTOPIA (May 19, 2008, 5:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/ 
2008/05/the-ultimate-pr.  
 94. See Ela, supra note 6, at 128 (listing installing solar panels, buying a hybrid, and riding a 
bicycle as high-visibility activities too costly—in time or money—for many people); cf. John C. 
Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 107, 127 (2008) (noting that ―people with lesser means‖ may not be able to purchase more 
efficient vehicles).  
 95. These figures are based upon MSRP plus destination charge according to a Toyota.com 
model comparison of the base models of the 2010 Corolla and Prius. TOYOTA, http://www. 
toyota.com/compare/?modelCode=prius#h_overview (click ―Add Competitor‖ hyperlink; then select 
―Make‖, ―Model‖, ―Year‖, and ―Trim‖ for Toyota Corolla from drop down bars) (last visited Aug. 26, 
2011).  
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burned, hybrids are only relatively offsetting when it comes to the 
environmental harms of driving. If the buyer picks the Prius, less fuel will 
be consumed so the payment to the third-party offsetting institution can be 
that much less than it would be for the Corolla. The nature of the product 
itself provides consumers the opportunity to partially offset the harm of a 
normal vehicle by paying more for a vehicle with a built-in offset.
96
  
Separate discussion of hybrid vehicles is warranted because they have 
become the modern symbol of socially conscious consumption, not 
because they are intrinsically different from some of the products in a 
different category. Though a single product category, hybrids have 
assumed an important role in our collective consciousness and 
understanding of consumption. Positively, hybrids have opened up our 
eyes to the impact our choices have on the environment. Negatively, the 
single decision—buy hybrid or not—has displaced greater introspection or 
public debate about the responsibility people have for the externalities of 
consumption.
97
  
3. Fair Trade and Production Certifications  
For people concerned that the goods they purchase might have been 
made by exploiting workers or using environmentally harmful practices, 
there is often little information available about each good‘s production 
history. Companies sometimes self-label products as ―environmentally 
friendly‖ or ―green,‖ but absent regulatory standards, such labeling is only 
a marginal improvement on the information available to consumers.
98
 
 
 
 96. From the limited perspective of correcting for carbon emissions, hybrids are not cost-
effective considering how cheaply offsets can be purchased. See Note, Uncommon Goods: On 
Environmental Virtues and Voluntary Carbon Offsets, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2065, 2076 (2010) 
[hereinafter Note, Uncommon Goods].  
 97. See Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social 
Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 428–29 (2006) [hereinafter Green, You Can’t Pay Them 
Enough] (noting that subsidies to purchase ―green‖ cars may not lead consumers to make other pro-
environment life changes).  
 98. The fecundity of such labels makes environmentally conscious consumption difficult, as a 
student comment explained: ―Businesses sense the dissemination of ‗green-mania‘ and 
correspondingly attempt to ‗out-green their competition.‘ Unfortunately, the virtual inundation of 
‗environmentally friendly‘ products makes consumer confusion inevitable and environmental 
protection questionable.‖ Kimberly C. Cavanagh, Comment, It’s A Lorax Kind Of Market! But Is It A 
Sneetches Kind Of Solution?: A Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental Marketing 
Regulation, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 133, 135 (1998). See also David F. Welsh, Environmental Marketing 
and Federal Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green”, 81 CALIF. L. 
REV. 991, 993 (1993) (―The lack of clearly defined national standards has left consumers uncertain 
about what claims to believe. Less-than-honest manufacturers have the latitude to test the uncertain 
boundaries of existing regulations by making dubious claims.‖) (footnote omitted).  
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―Fair trade‖ and other forms of production certifications offer a degree of 
security and peace of mind for buyers. With some certifications, 
consumers can know, or at least reasonably believe, that the t-shirts they 
are buying were not manufactured in an abusive sweatshop or that the 
copy paper was not created using unsustainable forestry practices.
99
 
Although originally limited to specialty stores such as Ten Thousand 
Villages, fair trade certified products can now be found in a wide variety 
of commercial locations, including some stores whose focus on low prices 
would seem to preclude such goods.
100
  
Given the number and variety of fair trade and other, usually 
environmental, production certifications, consumers may not always be 
getting what they hope to when they see such labels.
101
 In coffee alone 
there are multiple forms of certifications from different certifying 
institutions. This can make it very hard for consumers to know what the 
particular certification really means or if the certification is given for 
production below the standards they desire.
102
 And what should consumers 
do when faced with the problem of competing social goods: given the 
choice, should they buy shade grown coffee (good for the environment) or 
fair trade coffee (good for coffee workers)? One way retailers attempt to 
get around these issues is by including descriptions or photographs of the 
workers or thriving environments so that buyers feel connected to the 
production process.
103
 Such descriptions or photographs may also serve as 
supporting proof for the fair trade or production certification label.
104
  
 
 
 99. In the clothing sector alone, the range of ethical labels—no-child labor, no-sweatshop, fair 
trade, fair price, no toxic substances, organic, et cetra—is dizzying. See Onno Kuik, Fair Trade and 
Ethical Labeling in the Clothing, Textile, and Footwear Sector: The Case of Blue Jeans, 11 ILSA J. 
INT‘L & COMP. L. 619, 627 (2005) (collecting and explaining such labels).  
 100. See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, For Wal-Mart, Fair Trade May be More Than a Hill of Beans, 
WASH. POST, June 12, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2006/06/11/AR2006061100813.html (describing Wal-Mart‘s foray in to fair trade coffee).  
 101. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Boundaries 
and Leakages 46 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 09-51, 2009), available at http://www.rff. 
org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-51.pdf (―[T]he profusion of labels has generated ‗label confusion‘ 
and ‗label fatigue.‘‖); see also Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, supra 
note 46, at 2156–57 (listing the range of certifications that can be found).  
 102. See Karbowski, supra note 50, at 740–41.  
 103. In this respect, fair trade retailers operate in a manner similar to peer-to-peer lending 
organizations, most famously Kiva and Global Giving, which ―provide enough information to make a 
personal connection between the donor and the recipient.‖ Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, 
Democratizing Foreign Aid: Online Philanthropy and International Development Assistance, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 1111, 1117 (2010).  
 104. Through photography you are not buying a good made in El Salvador; you are buying 
something made by a particular family whose faces, perhaps even with a summary of their life, you see 
while shopping.  
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Even if there are no certification problems, perhaps consumers should 
not prefer fair trade or other certified products. A slight detour into 
economic theory can help explain why consumers may be wrong to insist 
upon such certification. American politicians, Democrats and Republicans 
alike, generally support trade liberalization and urge other countries to 
support free trade as well. They do so in part because of David Ricardo, a 
19th century economist. According to Ricardo, countries (or firms or 
individuals) can have an absolute or a comparative advantage in trade for 
particular products.
105
 Suppose there are only two products: t-shirts and 
umbrellas. Country A might be able to produce both t-shirts and umbrellas 
for less money than country B; that is, country A has an absolute 
advantage in both t-shirts and umbrellas. Does this mean that country A 
will produce everything and country B nothing? No. Ricardo showed that 
country B can still have a comparative advantage in whichever of these 
products it can produce at a lower opportunity cost than country A. If 
umbrellas and t-shirts can be made for the same amount of money in 
country A, but umbrellas sell for double, it makes sense for country A to 
specialize in umbrellas because there is a high opportunity cost of 
producing t-shirts. Country B, therefore, has a comparative advantage in t-
shirts and can trade t-shirts to country A for umbrellas. Ricardo showed 
that, through trade, both countries end up benefiting even though one 
country has an absolute production advantage.
106
  
For personal reasons, I spend a lot of time in El Salvador.
107
 A major 
export of El Salvador, besides people,
108
 is clothing produced in maquilas. 
Upon seeing these factories, Americans tend to instinctively call them 
sweatshops and to mentally impose upon them all the negative 
connotations associated with that term.
109
 Such factories seem on first 
 
 
 105. See DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (3d ed. 
1821), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html.  
 106. For another elaboration of Ricardo‘s idea of comparative advantage emphasizing the 
limitations of free trade, see Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, supra 
note 46, at 2136–37.  
 If the concept of comparative advantage still seems confusing, do not worry, you are not alone. 
Paul Krugman has written an entire essay trying to explain why intellectuals, ―people who do value 
ideas, . . . somehow find this particular idea impossible to grasp.‖ Paul Krugman, Ricardo’s Difficult 
Idea: Why Intellectuals Don’t Understand Comparative Advantage, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FREEDOM AND TRADE VOLUME TWO 22 (Gary Cook ed. 1998), available 
at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/ricardo.htm.  
 107. See Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 n.10 (2008) (explaining 
why).  
 108. Id. at 6–11.  
 109. See Micheletti & Stolle, supra note 65, at 161–65 (providing a history of the ―sweatshop‖ 
metaphor and of anti-sweatshop activism).  
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encounter the antithesis of the sort of working conditions U.S. consumers 
hope are taken into account through fair trade certifications. Without 
defending the working conditions in El Salvador‘s maquilas, socially 
responsible consumers should probably ask not only about the conditions, 
but also about the alternatives available to workers.
110
 It can be impolitic 
to think about trade in this way; Lawrence Summers‘ suggestion that 
Africa be turned into a dumping ground for the developed world‘s trash is 
a good case in point.
111
 Brazil‘s Secretary of the Environment‘s response 
to Summers captured the near universal rejection of the memo‘s argument: 
―Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally insane. . .‖112 For our 
purposes, I am similarly rejecting the argument that, because of trade gains 
made possible by comparative advantage, American consumers should be 
indifferent to working and environmental conditions.
113
 Fair trade and 
other product certifications exist because some consumers‘ sense of social 
responsibility extends to the production process of the goods they buy, 
even when those goods are produced in foreign countries.  
When consumers buy a product certified according to fair trade or 
environmentally responsible standards, they are paying for three things: 
 
 
 110. Consumers who fail to appreciate the context of production risk being ―morally naïve‖ by 
insisting upon utopian values. Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 7, at 597 (giving this 
explanation as part of a presentation of arguments made by developing countries against ―process-
based trade measures‖). See also id. at 621 (―One frequent . . . concern holds that, by seeking to avoid 
the fruits of exploited labor, consumers may contribute to market dynamics that ultimately leave 
developing world workers with an even worse fate than they currently endure.‖); Kuik, supra note 99, 
at 635 (arguing that increased reliance on production certifications in the blue jean industry would shift 
production to industrialized countries and ―leave many informal workers, many of them women and 
children, in the cold‖).  
 111. The suggestion was made in a memo signed by Summers when he was chief economist for 
the World Bank. Summers wrote, ―I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in 
the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that. . . . I‘ve always thought that 
under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under polluted.‖ Jay Johnson et al., Potential Gains 
from Trade in Dirty Industries: Revisiting Lawrence Summers’ Memo, 27 CATO J. 397, 398 (2007) 
(quoting from the Summers memo).  
 112. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1574 (2002) (quoting Jose Lutzenburger) (ellipsis 
in original). See also Noam Chomsky, What We Know: On the Universals of Language and Rights, 
BOSTON REV., Summer 2005, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3/chomsky.php (―[There is] 
virtual unanimity of the moral judgment that the reasoning is insane, even if logical.‖); James A. 
Swaney, So What’s Wrong with Dumping on Africa?, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES 367 (1994) (deconstructing 
Summers‘ memo).  
 113. Andrea Giampetro-Meyer argues that a better alternative to relying upon comparative 
advantage alone when deciding on allowable externalities in poor countries is to use a ―fortif[ied]‖ 
version of the following test: ―The practice is permissible if and only if the members of the home 
country would, under conditions of economic development similar to those of the host country, regard 
the practice as permissible.‖ Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 57, at 85–86 (quoting Thomas Donaldson, 
Moral Minimums for Multinationals, in ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A READER 455, 472 (Joel 
H. Rosenthal ed. 1999)).  
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the product, the certification expenses, and the added production expense 
associated with the good.
114
 The certification expenses—establishing the 
system, visiting factories, hiring independent inspectors, covering 
administrative overhead—can be thought of as the transaction costs 
required for meaningful fair trade or other certification labeling.
115
 The 
additional production expense, paid for by consumers through higher 
prices (or taxes if government sponsored), arguably serves as a form of 
quasi offsetting.
116
 Similar to the added expense of a hybrid vehicle, 
consumption of fair trade or other certified products involves consumers 
spending more money to avoid the externalities associated with the 
production of the goods they purchase. Paying less, they could have 
bought a substitute product or competitive good, but without the 
knowledge of the product‘s origins that certifications provide. Or, they 
could have bought the competitive good and then paid a third party—say a 
workers‘ rights organization—to offset poor working conditions 
associated with their purchase. By paying more for certified goods, 
consumers avoid the production harm(s) in a single transaction that they 
would otherwise correct for with an offset payment.  
Quasi offsetting is not deliberate offsetting; making the existence of the 
category, the types of market practices that fit within the category, and the 
value added by such practices debatable.
117
 When you buy a product 
because it is connected to a particular company or cause, or it has a 
production certification, there is often an offsetting aspect to the product 
relative to alternative purchases you could have made. But the aspect that 
is arguably a form of offsetting also changes the nature of the product in 
ways that are not captured when you simply compare it to similar goods. 
When I eat Ben & Jerry‘s, it somehow tastes better than other premium ice 
cream; my belief that the company is socially responsible and gives to 
 
 
 114. Certification expenses include third party audits, necessary to protect against 
―unsubstantiated and sometimes false claims‖ regarding environmental or social impacts. Roberts, 
supra note 3, at 21–22.  
 115. Cf. Kuik, supra note 99, at 630 (identifying the certification industry as a winner in the rise 
of certification).  
 116. For a rich discussion of the costs of a government-backed human rights labeling of products 
program and such a certification scheme‘s relationship to global free trade, see Karbowski, supra note 
50.  
 117. As Dadush observed in her recent article on the (RED) campaign, ―[t]he question of where 
profit ends and philanthropy begins is of crucial importance because it cuts deeply into public trust in 
philanthropy. Where the line between profit and charity is difficult to discern, both consumer 
protection and philanthropy step onto shaky ground.‖ Dadush, supra note 75, at 1292. But see Malani 
& Posner, supra note 66 (arguing in favor of blurring the line); Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and 
Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2010) (discussing how the boundary 
between for-profit and nonprofit has already been blurred). 
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worthy causes makes me happier when I buy their overpriced ice cream 
pints. Although as a driver of a used Toyota I cannot say with certainty, I 
imagine that drivers of hybrids get a thrill or a sense of contentment when 
the Prius silently pulls out of a parking space.
118
 And even if a handmade 
fair trade rug looks exactly the same as a mass-manufactured rug for sale 
at IKEA, consumers experience ownership of the fair trade rug 
differently.
119
 Although the above are generalizations, integrating an offset 
into products has the effect on consumers of making them into different 
products.  
Quasi offsetting is likely to be incomplete offsetting. Buying the fair 
trade coffee might protect against worker exploitation but does nothing to 
offset the carbon emissions required to bring the coffee to market. A 
hybrid diminishes, but does not eliminate, the harmful effects of driving. 
These observations are not meant as criticism of socially aware 
consumption, but instead reflect the limitations of quasi offsetting as 
currently offered to consumers by retailers and producers.
120
 Quasi 
offsetting practices provide the experiential foundation—by familiarizing 
consumers with the idea of production externalities and acculturating them 
to the possibility of correcting for such harms—necessary for independent 
institutional offsetting.  
B. Environmental Offsets 
Offsetting is most fully institutionalized in the environmental context. 
Consumers can make supplemental payments to a wide range of third-
party institutions to offset everything from airline travel to electricity 
usage. The many available options and the separation of purchase and 
offsetting decisions force consumers to take a more active role with 
institutional offsetting. Rather than simply buying something with a built-
in offset, individuals must elect post-consumption to make a separate 
 
 
 118. The electric motor of the Prius is quiet relative to gas motors and the gas engine does not 
kick in until the vehicle is accelerating sufficiently. See Richard S. Chang, Are Hybrids Too Quiet?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E2D81 
339F934A15757C0A96E9C8B63 (discussing the danger this can pose to pedestrians).  
 119. See Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 7, at 532 (―[C]onsumer products—even 
when physically indistinguishable—are not perfect substitutes to the extent that they are produced 
using different processes about which consumers have strong feelings.‖).  
 120. Although it is theoretically possible for retailers or producers to offer consumers payment 
choices (pay one amount if consumers want the producer to pay a living wage to employees, another 
amount if consumers want the producer to limit pollution, and a third amount if consumers want both) 
or to offer a fully offset product, so far the choices have been take-it-or-leave-it limited certifications. 
Offering a range of prices and offset options may signal to consumers the presence of production 
harms in a way that most companies would rather avoid.  
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payment to a third-party offset institution. The advantage of institutional 
offsetting is that it permits consumers to fully offset purchases as defined 
by either their conscience or externally established parameters. This is also 
institutional offsetting‘s biggest weakness. Relying upon consumers to 
actively decide to offset their consumption and to determine the 
appropriate manner and level of payment risks the possibility that 
consumers will remain the passive consumers they generally are today. 
Making offsetting a standard part of the consumption routine involves 
strengthening both formal institutions and the norms that surround 
offsetting. People can and do change their behavior in response to 
institutional development, technological change, and evolving customs. 
For offsetting to become commonplace, consumer behavior and society‘s 
expectations must change to reflect the understanding that consumption is 
often associated with harmful externalities.  
1. Factors Driving Environmental Offsetting 
Driven by increasing awareness of global warming and the harmful 
effects of fossil fuel consumption, the leading edge of change is occurring 
in environment-related offsetting behavior. The environmental field 
perhaps was uniquely ready to embrace offsetting because of the insistence 
by environmental economists that environmental harms and goods were 
tradable. Additionally, while economists rely upon money as a simplifying 
proxy for welfare, environmental harm, in some ways, is more calculable 
than other social harms. Finally, besides having great mascots—polar 
bears—for the cause, there is a greater degree of self-interest present in 
righting global warming and environmental harm than is true for many 
other consumption offset categories.
121
 These factors have pushed 
environmental offsetting ahead of poverty and inequality offsetting in 
terms of institutional development and behavioral modification by 
consumers.  
There is no longer serious scientific debate about the existence of 
climate change or about the human causes of potentially devastating 
global warming.
122
 Scientists are in near universal agreement about 
climate change, the causes, and even steps that can be taken to reduce 
 
 
 121. A note about human rights labels argues for taking a page from the environmental movement 
by using ―images of child slaves or female sweatshop workers‖ to ―stir similar sentiments in the 
American market‖ as was done with animal imagery. Karbowski, supra note 50, at 746.  
 122. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 879, 879 (2008) (―Climate change is a global problem, and there is little doubt about its 
seriousness and the challenges it poses for our society.‖).  
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global warming.
123
 That has not stopped naysayers from casting doubt on 
the underlying science in order to inspire political debate and protect 
business interests.
124
 What uncertainty does exist regarding climate change 
similarly is exploited by politicians to obfuscate the voters.
125
 The reports 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) capture the 
scientific community‘s consensus on climate change.126 According to the 
IPCC‘s Third Assessment Report, ―most of the observed warming over the 
last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas 
concentrations.‖127 Without taking steps to reign in greenhouse gas 
emissions, temperatures will continue to rise, causing ―grave and 
disastrous‖ impacts on human civilization.128 The American public‘s 
awareness of the human causes and dangers of climate change has 
significantly improved since President George W. Bush made the United 
 
 
 123. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, for example, note that ―a strong consensus supports the view 
that the world would benefit from significant steps to control greenhouse gas emissions,‖ and continue 
by arguing that there is also ―a consensus‖ that the solution involves either an emissions tax or a cap-
and-trade system. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 
1574 (2008).  
 124. As Paul Krugman argues, ―If you want to understand opposition to climate action, follow the 
money.‖ Paul Krugman, Who Cooked the Planet?, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/opinion/26krugman.html. Oil-company-funded efforts succeeded 
in raising climate change doubt for two decades, but despite these ―distracting side shows,‖ Sarah 
Krakoff argues, ―we are largely over the narrative of scientific doubt, at least in most mainstream 
circles.‖ Sarah Krakoff, Parenting the Planet, in THE ETHICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 160 
(Denis G. Arnold ed. forthcoming) (manuscript at 168–69), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1548658. See also Letter to the Editor, Climate Change and the Integrity of Science, SCI. MAG., May 
7, 2010, at 689, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/ full/328/5979/689 (signed by all 
members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences) (―Many recent assaults on climate science and, 
more disturbingly, on climate scientists by climate change deniers are typically driven by special 
interests or dogma, not by an honest effort to provide an alternative theory that credibly satisfies the 
evidence.‖).  
 125. See Libecap, supra note 33, at 406; Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and 
Corporate Disclosure: Are Things Heating Up in the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 296 
(2008).  
 126. See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 10 (2003) (noting that the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report ―manifested‖ the ―overwhelming scientific consensus‖).  
 127. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE 
SCIENTIFIC BASIS 10 (2001) (part of the IPCC Third Assessment Report), available at http://www. 
grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/pdf/WG1_TAR-FRONT.pdf. The IPCC‘s Fourth Assessment Report 
similarly notes, ―Anthropogenic warming over the last three decades has likely had a discernible 
influence at the global scale on observed changes in many physical and biological systems.‖ 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 41 
(2007) (part of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report) (italics in original, bold emphasis of the entire 
text removed), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.  
 128. Rajendra K Pachauri, Chairman, IPC, Acceptance Speech for the Nobel Peace Prize Awarded 
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Dec. 10, 2007) at 8–9, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/graphics/speeches/nobel-peace-prize-oslo-10-december-2007.pdf (describing the 
effects of a 5ºC rise in global temperatures relative to pre-industrial temperatures).  
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States an international environmental outlier by rejecting the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2001.
129
 Acceptance of the science of global warming, 
combined with appreciation of the role of individual consumption, is an 
important factor in the growth of environmental offset options.  
The responses to global warming currently on the political negotiating 
table are all based upon environmental economics‘ approaches.130 Since 
poor environmental resource allocation and resulting destruction can be 
attributed largely to ubiquitous market failures, the irony of turning to 
market solutions should not be lost.
131
 Environmental economists advocate 
a market approach to environmental goods. For perhaps most 
environmental economists, the problem of environmental degradation, 
including that causing global warming, is inadequate ownership or 
property rights in the environment.
132
 They argue that the costs of allowing 
unregulated pollution are higher than the costs, per Demsetz‘s definition of 
externalities,
133
 of internalizing pollution externalities. Prior to the rise of 
environmental economics, environmental governance was almost entirely 
in the form of command-and-control regulation.
134
 Whether prohibiting 
 
 
 129. There is, of course, room for improvement; the American public, for example, 
―underestimates the degree of scientific consensus over global climate change.‖ Rhode & Ross, supra 
note 34, at 163 (based on 2004 survey data). The ―losing‖ candidate for President in 2000, Al Gore, 
deserves some of the credit for informing the public about climate change through his documentary An 
Inconvenient Truth (2006), but attention to the issue has also been generated by events such as 
Hurricane Katrina and the efforts of environmental non-profits. See Andrew Green, Self Control, 
Individual Choice, and Climate Change, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 80 (2008) [hereinafter Green, Self 
Control] (highlighting the connection between a ―spike‖ in climate change interest and both An 
Inconvenient Truth and Katrina).  
 130. Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Tempurature: Which Federal Climate Change 
Legislative Proposal is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 135 (2007); Carol M. Rose, Hot 
Spots in the Legislative Climate Change Proposals, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 189, 189 (2008). 
 131. Blumm, for example, argues ―Markets persistently fail to produce the ecological and health 
information necessary to allocate efficiently environmental resources. . . . [and therefore] markets 
cannot supplant government intervention to correct environmental market failure.‖ Michael C. Blumm, 
The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 371, 388 (1992). See 
also Brown, supra note 30, at 397 (―Global climate change is often viewed as the result of the failure 
of the free market to apportion optimal allocations of resources in the society.‖). But Blumm goes on 
to support studies of ―how markets can be used to implement environmental policy, not establish it.‖ 
Blumm, supra note 131, at 389.  
 132. Economists who believe in market-driven environmental policies argue that ―[o]nce property 
is privatized, the free market will operate efficiently to optimize the utility of the good.‖ Brown, supra 
note 30, at 397. But it should be acknowledged that for the market to operate, political and collective 
decisions have to be made about how the market will function and how rights will be distributed. Id. at 
403–04. See also Sinden, supra note 10, at 570–71 (highlighting the role of the government 
establishing the limits in pollution markets).  
 133. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 134. ―Command and control rules impose detailed, legally enforceable limits, conditions, and 
affirmative requirements on industrial operations, generally controlling sources that generate pollution 
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certain forms of pollution or prescribing a particular technology, 
command-and-control regulation allowed companies little flexibility to 
determine for themselves how to meet their environmental obligations and 
failed to reward pollution reduction.
135
 More importantly, command-and-
control regulation made it difficult for economies to reorient and change 
priorities among different firms or industries. Environmental economists 
showed, under their assumptions regarding the market, that by making 
pollution, specifically the right to pollute, something that could be owned, 
societies could reduce their total pollution at less cost than through 
command-and-control regulation.
136
 Firms‘ environmental quality 
becomes subject to market pressure: firms with lower pollution per good 
would have a competitive advantage over ―dirty‖ firms.137 The same holds 
for entire industries; ―dirty‖ industries have to compete with ―clean‖ 
industries, but society can continue consuming ―dirty‖ products if people 
were willing to pay enough for them.
138
  
Environmental economics offered something for everyone.
139
 For 
conservatives, environmental economics offered an escape from 
command-and-control (read ―communist‖), state-driven regulation. 
Progressives—at that point still called liberals—and regulators were 
attracted to the idea that an upper limit could be placed on pollution: the 
limit being defined by the total amount of pollution rights that society 
 
 
on an individual basis.‖ Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous 
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998).  
 135. See Richard L. Sandor et al., An Overview of a Free-Market Approach to Climate Change 
and Conservation, 360 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. A 1607, 1609 (2002).  
 136. As Kenneth Richards observes, ―One consistent message from the environmental economics 
literature is that incentive-based instruments are a more cost-effective means to achieve environmental 
goals than alternative policy instruments such as technology-based standards.‖ Kenneth R. Richards, 
Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y F. 221, 222 (2000).  
 137. Firms that hit pollution targets would not have to purchase the right to pollute and firms that 
further reduce pollution could sell the rights to pollute they are not using. See Joanna D. Malaczynski 
& Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating 
the California Environmental Quality Act with the California Global Warming Solutions Act, 36 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 89 (2009). 
 138. Payment would come through both higher prices, so that the dirty industry could purchase 
enough pollution rights to continue production, and foregone consumption of other products produced 
by firms unable to purchase the pollution rights necessary for their manufacturing process.  
 139. This point should not be oversold: liberals and now progressive scholars have written 
trenchant critiques of the problems of reducing environmental decision making to an economic 
framework and in applying economic tools to environmental protection. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 
131; Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1981); 
Sinden, supra note 10; see also Wallace E. Oates, From Research to Policy: The Case of 
Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 135, 138–39 (2000) (explaining the initial resistance 
to environmental economics approaches by both environmentalists and polluters).  
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would permit to be owned.
140
 It is worth quoting at length Amy Sinden‘s 
critical description of the dominant approach to environmental problems 
today:  
 Thus, as academics and policymakers clamor to distance 
themselves from the now dowdy and stilted fashions of 1970s-style 
―command-and-control regulation‖ and to embrace the virtues of 
the free market, privatization has replaced government intervention 
as the preferred solution to the tragedy of the commons. Right wing 
ideologues pump out books, articles, and monographs touting the 
virtues of ―free-market environmentalism‖ and claiming that all 
environmental problems can eventually be solved by simply 
defining and enforcing private property rights and allowing the free 
market to function. But even more moderate voices, who point out 
the obvious impracticality of privatizing many natural resources, 
still hurry to agree that privatization is often superior to government 
regulation and should therefore be pursued wherever practicable. 
Thus, extremists and moderates alike tout any environmental policy 
that looks or smells anything like private property or a market as 
either an example of the privatization solution or an ―intermediate‖ 
or ―hybrid‖ scheme that is moving us in that direction.141 
The only qualification to Sinden‘s explanation is to note that the 
description of those advocating property, market, and/or economic 
approaches includes academics and policy makers across the entire 
political spectrum—conservatives, moderates, and progressives. 
Environmental economics has become the preferred solution to most 
environmental ―bads.‖  
A critical assumption of environmental economics is the fungibility of 
environmental goods and of environmental bads. A major effort within the 
field is to establish the value of environmental goods, even environmental 
goods that non-economists might think of as priceless.
142
 Studies attempt 
 
 
 140. Cf. Oates, supra note 139, at 144 (noting that a tax or fee scheme does not allow government 
to set the total quantity of pollution, but tradable permits do).  
 141. Sinden, supra note 10, at 537 (footnotes omitted). For more on the rise of environmental 
economics, see Oates, supra note 139.  
 142. Economists do this by using surveys or other proxies that attempt to price things for which a 
market does not exist such as ―the ‗intangible‘ or ‗symbolic-moralistic‘ utility that wilderness areas 
provide.‖ Sagoff, supra note 139, at 1408. See also Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 821, 852–53 (2009). Of course many legal scholars have argued that ―the value of some things 
cannot be translated into a monetary figure, and these things should not be traded, at least with 
complete freedom, on the open market.‖ Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 341 (2008) (describing Margaret Jane Radin‘s ―personhood‖ theory of 
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to answer not only questions such as how much would people pay to have 
clean air, but also what is the non-use value of the existence of gorillas or 
panda bears.
143
 The idea that something should not be monetized is largely 
rejected by environmental economists, allowing the explicit trade-off of 
one environmental good for another.
144
 Moreover, by putting a dollar 
figure on environmental harm based on revealed preferences, societies can 
compare environmental harm against non-environmental goods, 
particularly economic growth. This comparison allows decisions to be 
made based on dollar amounts that supposedly capture how much people 
value the environment. Some scholars find this decision-making process 
dangerous or impossible,
145
 but environmental economics seems to allow 
decisions—such as whether it is better to have air pollution and 3 percent 
growth or cleaner air and only 2 percent growth—to be made using a 
single, dollar-denominated, framework. Similarly, a single, market-type 
framework has the added benefit of allowing seemingly incomparable and 
distinct environmental harms—for example, destruction of the Florida 
Everglades and overfishing of tuna—to be treated as fungible.146  
Environmental economists recognize that there is no such thing as 
perfect fungibility of different environmental harm types, but the threat of 
climate change excuses a certain narrowing of focus that supports the 
fungibility assumption. A person in Colorado who lives near Bureau of 
Land Management land will experience excessive logging harm and may 
not even know about equally destructive chemical pollution in Maryland. 
 
 
property). See also Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 112, at 1584 (―Cost-benefit analysis cannot 
overcome its fatal flaw: it is completely reliant on the impossible attempt to price the priceless values 
of life, health, nature, and the future.‖).  
 143. Researcher calculations include such things as: the ―[v]alue of waste management services 
provided by dung beetles to U.S. cattle ranchers‖ ($380 million/year); the ―[v]alue of pollination 
services provided to the state‘s sunflower seed production industry by California‘s wild bees‖ ($11.1 
million/year); and even the ―[v]alue to human beings of all the services provided by Earth‘s natural 
capital‖ ($33 trillion/year). David Wolman, How to Get Wall Street to Hug a Tree, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
11, 2007, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/11/magazine/tm-greenies06. See also 
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 112, at 1557–59 (providing a brief overview of valuation 
methods in environmental economics).  
 144. Many scholars and environmentalists disfavor both market-based conservation methods and 
describing environmental goods in terms of economic values. See, e.g., Douglas J. McCauley, 
Commentary: Selling Out on Nature, NATURE, Sept. 7, 2006, at 27.  
 145. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 204–34 (2004); Brown, supra note 30, at 406; Sagoff, 
supra note 139, at 1412–18. 
 146. The U.S. EPA facilitates the treatment of different wetland areas as fungible through its 
mitigation bank that allows those who cause negative impacts on aquatic resources to correct for such 
harm by restoring a different wetland. For more on mitigation banking, see Mitigation Banking 
Factsheet, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/ 
fact16.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
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Local harms are not fungible for the individual.
147
 Besides location, there 
is also imperfect fungibility of types of harm. Nuclear energy is a good 
case in point. The extreme period of time that nuclear waste remains 
harmful, the possibility of nuclear disasters, and our continued inability to 
find a long-term storage solution for nuclear waste inspired lengthy 
debates among environmentalists about the desirability of nuclear energy 
development.
148
 When nuclear and fossil fuel generated electricity were 
compared, environmentalists ran into the problem of competing ―bads,‖ 
with the different types of harm associated with the alternative energy 
options making it hard to break the impasse. While the downsides of 
nuclear energy have not changed, climate change is forcing even 
environmentalists long opposed to nuclear power plants to change their 
position.
149
 As a recent law review article notes, ―Climate change threatens 
to be the externality that ate the world.‖150 Global warming is forcing 
former nuclear detractors to support nuclear power as part of the strategy 
to transition from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources. Although 
environmental issues are far more expansive than climate change alone 
(endangered species, clean water, loss of habitat, non-greenhouse-gas 
pollution, and many other challenges are all important environmental 
issues), a narrowing of popular environmental concern to global warming 
adds a certain credibility to the idea that environmental harms are fungible.  
A narrow focus on greenhouse gas emissions lends itself to a 
reductionist understanding of environmental harm and to greater space for 
environmental offsetting. It does not matter whether harmful greenhouse 
gases are emitted from a factory in China or one in Michigan, the net 
environmental effect is the same.
151
 This is also true of things that reduce 
greenhouse gases or greenhouse gas emissions; location is unimportant, 
what matters is the overall state of the atmosphere. Consumers who buy a 
good whose production is associated with X amount of greenhouse 
emissions can pay to prevent that amount of pollution from being created 
 
 
 147. More generally, Eduardo Peñalver argues that what he calls ―land‘s memory‖ may make land 
an often infungible resource. Peñalver, supra note 142, at 829–32, 847.  
 148. For more on the problem of storing radioactive waste produced by nuclear power, see 
Charles de Saillan, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States and Europe: A Persistent 
Environmental Problem, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 461 (2010).  
 149. Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and 
the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 48–49 (2008).  
 150. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and 
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1132 (2010) [hereinafter Purdy, The Politics of Nature].  
 151. See Rose, supra note 130, at 190 (―CO2 floats to the upper atmosphere and mixes around . . . 
creating no hotspots or any other kind of nonfungibility. . . . it does not even matter when it is 
produced‖).  
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somewhere else or to otherwise trap those emissions. Through fungibility 
of environmental harms and environmental benefits, the emissions can 
occur at one factory, the consumption take place somewhere else, and the 
corrective offset be implemented in yet another part of the world. The rise 
of environmental economics approaches, together with the assumption of 
interchangeable environmental harms and services, is the second factor 
driving the environmental field‘s lead when it comes to the 
institutionalization of consumption offsetting.  
A third factor that helps explain the rise of environmental offsetting is 
that environmental harms may lend themselves to greater calculability 
than non-environmental harms. Making an offsetting payment for 
environmental harms helps others just as a similar payment to ensure 
workers get paid a living wage helps others. But for reasons that will be 
explored in Part II.C, a consumer may not believe that direct or indirect 
aid to underpaid employees will reduce poverty, make the world a better 
place, or right a harm associated with his or her consumption. 
Environmental offsetting, in contrast, seems to offer calculable benefits.
152
 
Finding a regulatory response to global environmental harm has been hard, 
in part, because a healthy atmosphere is the ultimate public good, and 
hence there are frequent opportunities for countries to block cooperative 
solutions by being free-riders or hold-outs.
153
 The pollution of a single 
country is not a localized harm; instead it goes into the atmosphere and 
harms the entire planet. The country‘s contribution to global warming is 
calculable, but getting countries to agree on a plan to reduce emissions has 
been hampered by conflict between high wealth/high emission developed 
nations and low wealth/low emission nations.
154
 But this conflict need not 
paralyze environmental offsetting. Since consumption harm can be 
 
 
 152. To the extent carbon offsetting leads to increases in consumption or is accomplished through 
projects that do not offset in the long-term—for example, reforestation without protection against 
subsequent logging of the same forest—these benefits will be illusory.  
 153. Stated differently, ―In addressing a global problem, a national public must absorb the full 
cost of any measure it adopts, but will receive only a fraction of the globally distributed benefit.‖ 
Purdy, The Politics of Nature, supra note 150, at 1132.  
 154. The conflict revolves around whether poorer nations should be allowed to catch up 
economically through more lenient emission standards or bear additional burdens because they have 
not yet become the hyper-consuming societies of the West. These conflicting ideas about how to share 
the sacrifices involved in changing global consumption patterns have blocked progress towards both 
domestic and international greenhouse gas solutions. For more on the roots of the stalemate, see Ian 
Ayres & Doug Kysar, Adam Smith Meets Climate Change, SLATE (Sept. 25, 2008, 11:53 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2200911. See also Libecap, supra note 33, at 386–87 (providing a theoretical 
explanation for the international negotiation challenges surrounding open-access goods). For an 
argument that distributive and corrective justice claims do not justify heightened obligations on the 
United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 123.  
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calculated, individual consumers can diminish the global environmental 
harm through offsetting. Moreover, for consumers, the amount of the 
offset payment can be tailored to their level of consumption and associated 
level of harm.  
The final, and I believe most important, factor explaining 
environmental offsetting‘s uniquely strong growth and institutional 
development is the self-interested nature of environmental offsetting.
155
 
People are aware of the collective responsibility for, and enjoyment of, a 
healthy planet. The benefits of nature reach individual consumers, and 
some of those individually experienced benefits are threatened by global 
warming.
156
  
It is no coincidence that the image of global warming has become the 
polar bear, and often a very isolated polar bear floating on a small chunk 
of ice or swimming far removed from the ice shelf.
157
 Why have polar 
bears become so ubiquitous? Most of us will never see a polar bear in its 
natural environment and, though they look cuddly, they can be vicious 
carnivores. Yet there is something in us as humans that can get pleasure 
out of simply knowing that polar bears exist. Polar bears are representative 
of the many species and aspects of nature threatened by global warming, 
some of which Americans have first-hand experience with and some of 
which are more removed. Unlike the poor, who we blame for their 
poverty, we do not think of nature or animals as sharing fault for harms 
caused by our consumption. Changing direction on climate change, and 
 
 
 155. See Dernbach, supra note 94, at 124 (listing self-interest as among the three concerns—―self-
interest or self-preservation, the impact of climate change on other humans, and the impact of climate 
change on all life‖—that surround the ―norms‖ that can ―motivate[] appropriate individual behavior‖ 
regarding the environment).  
 156. The extreme free-rider problem associated with global environmental problems puts a natural 
limit on the extent self-interest alone can explain environmental offsetting. Individuals considering 
reducing their personal contribution to global warming ―face large costs but receive little benefit, given 
their negligible personal impact on climate change.‖ Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough, supra note 
97, at 411. See also Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the 
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 130 (2009) 
(arguing that the free-rider problem is raised when individuals compare their pollution to industrial 
sources). Jeremiah Purdy makes a similar observation about municipal adaptation of the Kyoto 
protocol, which ―makes little sense through the lens of narrow self-interest.‖ Purdy, The Politics of 
Nature, supra note 150, at 1193 (emphasis added).  
 157. The major environmental groups all began highlighting the threatened polar bear around the 
same time; the most heart-rending segment of the Discovery Channel‘s epic television mini-series 
―Earth‖ is on the effect global warming is having on the polar bear‘s quest for food, and the 2005 
NRDC gift membership card featured ―a photograph of two polar bears stranded on a small floating 
ice cap, the caption reading: ‗[a]s the polar bear‘s future literally melts away, the Bush Administration 
refuses to act.‘‖ Rhode & Ross, supra note 34, at 172. See also id. at 168 (explaining that 
―[c]ompelling visual images‖ are a way to ―overcome complacency‖).  
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saving the polar bear, is a classic collective action problem, but as the 
Center for Biological Diversity and others insist, it is ―not too late to save 
the polar bear.‖158 Environmental offsetting responds to the possibility that 
humans can and will choose to ―address the causes of climate change, 
including the unrestrained burning of fossil fuels.‖159 Doing so will help 
ensure that this and future generations get the benefits of a healthy planet, 
which is both a collective and an individual benefit of fighting climate 
change. Although the risk that others will not contribute their share is 
present with environmental offsetting, such payments are tied to an 
individual‘s personal benefits from offsetting and are still a form of self-
interested behavior.  
2. Environmental Offsetting Mechanisms 
What the Toyota Prius is to responsible consumption and quasi 
offsetting, TerraPass is to environmental and institutional offsetting.
160
 
Expedia, the online travel website, should be credited alongside TerraPass 
with introducing consumers to the idea that they can pay a third-party to 
offset the environmental harm associated with their travel.
161
 When 
consumers buy a plane ticket on Expedia, they are first told the price, 
including applicable taxes, of various flight options. Having selected the 
flight(s) they want, they are given the option of various upgrades or 
packages they can buy in addition to the flight, from city tours to theater 
tickets. One option they are given is to pay TerraPass, a for-profit 
company wholly independent of Expedia, to offset the environmental harm 
associated with their travel.
162
 The amount they pay is dependent upon 
 
 
 158. CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, NOT TOO LATE TO SAVE THE POLAR BEAR: A RAPID 
ACTION PLAN TO ADDRESS THE ARCTIC MELTDOWN (2007), available at http://www.biological 
diversity.org/publications/papers/ArcticMeltdown.pdf; see also The Arctic, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, 
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/arctic (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (―It‘s not too 
late . . . . [to] preserve the [Arctic] region‘s rich biodiversity‖).  
 159. Letter to the Editor, Climate Change and the Integrity of Science, supra note 124, at 689.  
 160. Tellingly, a recent article arguing for standardization in the carbon offset market begins, 
―Anyone who has booked online an airline flight, a hotel room, or rented a car in the last few years has 
had the opportunity to ‗offset‘ the greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution generated through their activities 
by investing in a carbon offset.‖ Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward 
Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 851, 851–52 (2009).  
 161. See Douglas McGray, SUV Redemption Sticker, WIRED MAG., July 2005, available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2005/suv_redemption_sticker (―If you think about 
your own personal impact on CO2, and you find out you can offset it for a reasonable amount of 
money, it makes you think differently about the problem. TerraPass is mind opening.‖ (quoting Ned 
Ford, a member of the Sierra Club‘s Global Warming and Energy Committee)).  
 162. As a Los Angeles Times story explains, TerraPass makes an ―investment in a carbon-
reducing enterprise, such as a wind farm‖ for the customer, ―and in the process makes a little money 
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how long their flight is; the longer the flight, the more they pay. By 
putting an easily accessible offsetting option directly before consumers, 
Expedia and TerraPass expose consumers to the possibility of offsetting 
their consumption and have started the work of making the option of 
offsetting a customary part of consumption.  
The main service TerraPass offers is a customer-friendly way of 
offsetting individual and family consumption.
163
 But the simplicity of the 
company‘s calculations raises numerous concerns related to whether the 
company is properly accounting for both the full extent of its customers‘ 
consumption and the effectiveness of company-funded offsetting projects. 
Some of these concerns are self-evident when a customer buys an offset 
tied to an Expedia flight. The amount a customer pays is based only on the 
distance of the flight and does not take into account other important 
factors, such as how full the flight is, how long the flight has to circle 
before landing, or how long the plane is stuck on the tarmac prior to 
flying. While taking such factors into account would require delaying final 
payment until after the flight, doing so would more accurately reflect the 
harm associated with an individual‘s travel. The TerraPass solution is 
perhaps the best available—the amount consumers pay for their offsets is 
based on averages, which avoids the complications of particularized 
accounting. The TerraPass website operates much the same way: products 
include the ―4-person family annual carbon offsets‖ for $369.00, 
―Average-sized car carbon offsets–one year‖ for $71.40, or ―Hybrid or 
efficient car–one year‖ offsets for $35.70.164 Customers can choose from 
among similar average-based offsets, or they can use the company‘s 
carbon footprint calculator to figure out a partially individualized account 
 
 
for itself too.‖ Wolman, supra note 143. As of December 2008, the majority of carbon offset providers 
were for-profit companies. Matthew J. Kotchen, Offsetting Green Guilt, 7 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION 
REV., Spring 2009, at 26, 29 [hereinafter Kotchen, Offsetting Green Guilt].  
 163. The focus here is on individual offsetting, but offsetting is also being done by companies, 
cities, and even countries. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 160, at 854–55 (discussing offsetting by 
Dell Computer Company); Joe Palca, Abu Dhabi Aims to Build First Carbon-Neutral City, NPR 
MORNING EDITION, May 6, 2008, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=90042092 (reporting on the planned development of Masdar City as a carbon-neutral city of 50,000 
people); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Vatican Penance: Forgive Us Our Carbon Output, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/17/world/europe/17carbon.html (reporting on 
the Vatican becoming the ―world‘s first carbon-neutral state‖ through a reforesting project in 
Hungary).  
 164. Carbon Offsets, TERRAPASS, http://store.terrapass.com/store/c/18-Carbon-offsets.html (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
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of their carbon consumption and the corresponding offset amount.
165
 They 
can even offset the carbon footprint associated with their wedding.
166
  
The idea behind carbon offsetting is relatively simple. Customers 
consume a set amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) or carbon dioxide 
equivalents (CO2e) and make a payment that will prevent that same 
amount of CO2 from being consumed elsewhere. TerraPass accomplishes 
this by directing customer payments towards landfill gas-to-energy 
projects, wind farms, and agriculture methane recovery facilities.
167
 The 
projects of a TerraPass competitor, Carbonfund.org, are similar but also 
include truck stop electrification, forest conservation, and hydroelectric 
projects.
168
 Independent non-profit auditors are used to verify that 
offsetting companies accomplish the carbon reductions paid for by 
consumers.
169
 The decision to pay TerraPass to accomplish an individual‘s 
offsetting is largely a matter of convenience for the consumer.
170
 However, 
this convenience comes at some cost to the consumer with a sincere desire 
to offset. Perhaps a preferable option would be to buy rights to pollute 
with CO2 from emission exchanges such as the European Climate 
 
 
 165. The TerraPass calculator uses the following information: automobile year, make, model, and 
miles driven/year; either a user-created list of individual flights/year or the number of short, medium, 
or long flights/year; and home location and utility bill amount. Carbon Footprint Calculator, 
TERRAPASS, http://www.terrapass.com/carbon-footprint-calculator (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
Consumers do need to use caution when relying upon carbon calculators, as different calculators 
generate different carbon emission estimates. J. Paul Padgett et al., A Comparison of Carbon 
Calculators, 28 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 106, 106–07 (2008). Dernbach has suggested that 
the government ―publish information on the energy or carbon footprint of individuals.‖ Dernbach, 
supra note 94, at 148.  
 166. The TerraPass wedding calculator includes guest airline and automobile emissions, hotel 
energy use, and energy connected to the actual wedding. Wedding Carbon Footprint Calculator, 
TERRAPASS, http://www.terrapass.com/wedding (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). See also Jura Koncius, 
Wedded to Green, WASH. POST, June 21, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/20/AR2007062000519.html?nav=emailpage (including information about 
a couple using TerraPass to offset then wedding guests‘ travel).  
 167. For a complete listing of TerraPass projects, see TerraPass Emissions Reduction Projects, 
TERRAPASS, http://www.terrapass.com/projects/listing.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). TerraPass, 
with its heavy reliance on methane capture, is taking advantage of the cheaper reduction possibilities 
of ―Super-Pollutants.‖ Cf. Andrew Schatz, Note, Discounting the Clean Development Mechanisms, 20 
GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV. 703, 719–20 (2008).  
 168. For a complete listing of Carbonfund.org projects, see Support Renewable Energy and 
Conservation Projects, CARBONFUND, http://www.carbonfund.org/projects (last visited Aug. 26, 
2011).  
 169. Eilene Zimmerman, Undoing Your Daily Damage to the Earth, for a Price, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/business/yourmoney/11carbon.html; 
cf. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 160 (arguing that there is a need for standardization and government 
oversight of the carbon offset market).  
 170. At some point, convenience becomes practicality, for while an individual could try to directly 
offset their contribution to global warming by planting enough trees, for most people it makes sense to 
pay a third party.  
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Exchange or the Chicago Climate Exchange.
171
 Ian Ayres and Barry 
Nalebuff explain:  
 When you buy CO2 offsets via TerraPass, it invests in renewable 
energy resources such as wind farms. But it isn‘t clear that the 
money you spend there really leads to lower pollution. While they 
are investing in clean-energy projects, those projects might have 
proceeded even without your investment.  
 If you truly want to be serious about reducing CO2, you can buy 
permits on the European exchange. Buying a permit to emit a ton of 
CO2 and then parking it unused is a more powerful way to make 
sure that your substitute is having an incremental impact. But for 
your purchase, a corporation would have emitted an extra ton of 
greenhouse gases.
172
  
Ayres and Nalebuff continue by noting that buying an offset for driving a 
Hummer on the European exchange costs 50 percent more than TerraPass 
charges, which they attribute to the exchange‘s greater effectiveness.173 
For projects to be classified as offsetting projects, they should both 
permanently reduce or sequester emissions and be of the sort that would 
not take place without the offset.
174
 Though the average American may 
find it complicated to enter these exchanges, through Carbonfund.org and 
similar intermediaries, consumers can purchase and retire CO2 emissions 
allowances from the Chicago Climate Exchange.
175
  
 
 
 171. See INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, INC., http://www.ecx.eu (last visited Aug. 26, 2011); 
CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 172. Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Environmental Atonement, FORBES MAG., Dec. 25, 2006 
[hereinafter Ayres & Nalebuff, Environmental Atonement], available at http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
news/3954.htm.  
 173. Id.  
 174. The ―additionality‖ requirement prevents actors from claiming to be accomplishing offsets 
that they could sell for actions they were already doing and planning on doing. Offsets have to be tied 
to ―projects that do something new,‖ which in the forestry context, ―require landowners to prove trees 
are about to be razed.‖ Margaret Newkirk, Tree-Saving Plan Has Credibility Questions, ATLANTA 
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, May 24, 2009, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/tree-saving-plan-has-
53515.html (listing requirements proposed by environmental advocates and some existing regional 
standards).  
 For discussion of the ―additionality‖ requirement under Europe‘s Clean Development Mechanism, 
see Dwyer Gunn, Are Carbon Offsets Too Good to Be True?, FREAKONOMICS: BLOG (Apr. 29, 2009, 
2:40 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/are-carbon-offsets-too-good-to-be-true. 
See also Ben Elgin, Another Inconvenient Truth: Behind the Feel-Good Hype of Carbon-Offsets, Some 
of the Deals Don’t Deliver, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek. 
com/magazine/content/07_13/b4027057.htm (raising questions about whether several TerraPass 
projects meet the additionality requirement).  
 175. See The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), CARBONFUND, http://www.carbonfund.org/site/ 
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TerraPass, Carbonfund.org, and direct purchase of pollution permits 
from climate exchanges are but a sampling of the hundreds of offsetting 
mechanisms that exist.
176
 In 2008, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office found more than 600 offsetting entities operating in the United 
States involving ―a wide range of participants, prices, transaction types, 
and projects.‖177 The carbon offset market is unusual because ―while most 
markets involve tangible goods or services, the carbon market involves a 
product that represents the absence of something—in this case, an offset 
equals the absence of one ton of carbon dioxide emissions.‖178 In theory, 
individuals could even sell their own offsets by promising to reduce their 
personal emissions.
179
 That this is not taking place attests to perhaps the 
biggest lesson from the rise of voluntary environmental offsetting, that 
institutional context and institutional development matters.
180
 The 
existence of a variety of user-friendly mechanisms for individuals to offset 
environmental harm associated with their consumption itself creates and 
supports the ―emerging‖ individual offsetting norms.181 Offsetting 
institutions—in tandem with greater public awareness of the threat of 
global warming and the role individuals play—help redefine consumption. 
People‘s outlook changes from apathy and indifference regarding the 
 
 
projects/profile/ccx (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). As a GAO report explains, ―The term ‗retirement‘ 
refers to the permanent recorded disposition of an offset after which it cannot be resold or otherwise 
used by any entity to facilitate, enable, or offset any past, present, or future greenhouse gas emission.‖ 
U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CARBON OFFSETS: THE U.S. VOLUNTARY MARKET IS 
GROWING, BUT QUALITY ASSURANCE POSES CHALLENGES FOR MARKET PARTICIPANTS 5 n.6 (GAO-
08-1048, 2008).  
 Even when customers are hoping to retire pollution allowances, care is needed to ensure the 
exchange they use is not ―manipulated in ways that artificially reduce the cost of carbon credits.‖ Juliet 
Howland, Comment, Not All Carbon Credits Are Created Equal: The Constitution and the Cost of 
Regional Cap-and-Trade Market Linkage, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 413, 430 (2009).  
 176. For a list of carbon offset providers and worldwide projects, see CARBON CATALOG, 
http://www.carboncatalog.org (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).  
 177. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7. For more on the price variability 
observed across carbon offset providers and projects, see Marc. N. Conte & Matthew J. Kotchen, 
Explaining the Price of Voluntary Carbon Offsets, 1 CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. 93 (2010).  
 178. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 37.  
 179. A voluntary household level offsetting scheme in fact has been proposed by Ayres and 
Nalebuff. See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Your Personal Climate Exchange, FORBES MAG., Nov. 24, 
2008, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/1124/148.html. Similarly, Vandenbergh and 
Ackerly raise the possibility of both individual-to-individual and community-to-community offsetting. 
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 55, 72–73 (2008).  
 180. For more on the possibilities and challenges of creating an individual-based offset market, 
see Dernbach, supra note 94, at 154–55.  
 181. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2007) (arguing law can help activate an emerging individual carbon-neutral 
norm). 
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environmental impact of individual consumption to interest in correcting 
for consumption externalities.  
Global warming and the problem of over-consumption of fossil fuels 
cannot be solved by relatively wealthy American consumers voluntarily 
making offsetting payments. More is demanded at both the global and 
individual levels.
182
 A global commitment, with the buy-in of both 
developed and developing nations, is seemingly a prerequisite for solving 
the common problems of greenhouse gas emissions.
183
 Offsetting is an 
imperfect substitute for consumption reductions and changes in behavior 
that avoid causing harm to begin with. In other words, making a voluntary 
offset payment may be just one of many obligations or sacrifices that 
should be asked of individuals in the fight against climate change.
184
 The 
limitations of offsetting must be acknowledged, but the recognition that 
offsetting institutions provide a way for individuals to mitigate harm tied 
to their lifestyle and consumption choices is equally important.  
C. Poverty Offsets 
Given that most of us will not take a vow of poverty, how should we 
take into account the relationship between our spending and global 
poverty? The proposal developed in this Part applies the concept and 
practice of environmental offsetting to the relationship between individual 
consumption and poverty.
185
 There are many observable examples of 
 
 
 182. Between 30 and 40 percent of U.S. CO2 emissions are under individuals‘ direct control—―a 
total equal to 8 percent of global emissions and greater than the emissions of Africa, Central America 
and South America combined.‖ Ela, supra note 6, at 98. As such, much more should be demanded of 
Americans in particular. Part of the problem is that ―the U.S. carbon footprint is simply too big to 
offset.‖ Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 160, at 854. But individual and household behavioral changes 
could fairly result in significant emission reductions with little adverse lifestyle effects. Thomas Deitz 
et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 
106 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 18452, 18452 (2009).  
 183. William Nordhaus has appropriately called the greenhouse effect ―the granddaddy of public 
goods problems.‖ William D. Nordhaus, Reflections on the Economics of Climate Change, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Autumn 1993, at 11, 18.  
 184. Getting Americans to sacrifice consumption for the sake of the environment is likely to be 
challenging, for survey data shows that ―while individuals express concern about climate change, they 
display a reluctance to support policies that will impose significant costs upon them unless there is a 
significant impact upon their daily lives.‖ Green, Self Control, supra note 129, at 78.  
 185. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Some forms of offsetting could benefit both the 
environment and the poor; most notably those supporting payments for environmental services. See, 
e.g., Stefano Pagiola et al., Can Payments for Environmental Services Help Reduce Poverty? An 
Exploration of the Issues and the Evidence to Date from Latin America, 33 WORLD DEV. 237 (2005); 
Daniel P. Schramm, “Do I Care?” Yes!: How the U.S. Carbon Offset Market Can Save Rural 
Communities, 44 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 241 (2010). An additional way to 
combine these forms of offsetting is through carbon market offerings that ―factor in social justice 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/2
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consumers practicing forms of partial offsetting to help the poor. These 
practices amount to an emerging custom of people voluntarily making 
charitable donations following consumption, often to third-party 
institutions that relate in some way to their consumption.
186
 However, 
these donations are only examples of partial, and not full, offsetting 
because the connection between consumption and the voluntary payment 
is neither institutionally linked nor defined proportionally. The donation 
made by the consumer does not necessarily relate to the goods purchased 
and the amount donated is seemingly independent of the amount 
consumed. Developing and strengthening institutions that facilitate and 
direct this observed behavior holds the promise of helping establish 
obligations to the poor connected with consumption. Just as offsetting 
companies derive their utility from consumer awareness of the 
externalities of energy consumption, a similar rationale exists for 
recognizing, and correcting, the poverty-related externalities of 
consumption.  
Although not yet categorized as such, some variations on the poverty 
offset concept can already be found. Customers walking through the 
checkout line at any number of businesses will find an expectation, not 
only to pay for their purchases, but also that they contribute towards a 
charity.
187
 While sometimes subtle—Whole Foods, for example, at one 
 
 
considerations when developing carbon credits‖ and which tellingly command a price premium over 
other voluntary carbon offset options. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Brooke A. Ackerly & Fred E. Foster, 
Micro-Offsets and Macro-Transformation: An Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 339 (2009). For more on developing such ―[e]quity [m]icro-[o]ffset 
projects,‖ see id. at 341–44. To the extent that ―support for environmental protection has grown in 
recent decades while support for progressive incomes [sic] policies, welfare, and other social support 
programs has considerably waned,‖ a strategy focusing on areas of overlap may be more successful 
than a narrow emphasis on poverty. Kristen A. Sheeran, Ecological Economics: A Progressive 
Paradigm?, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 21, 37 (2006).  
 186. For examples of such practices, see infra notes 187–90 and accompanying text.  
 187. The manner of facilitating charitable donations by the Healthy Spot Pet Store in Santa 
Monica, California provides a good example of how checkout line requests work. At Healthy Spot, 
when consumers are told their final bill, they are asked if they would like to give the amount needed to 
round up to the nearest dollar to the Best Friend Animal Rescue. See Amanda Dyer, Pros and Cons of 
Checkout Line Donations, NPR: MORNING ED. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=112014803. Amanda Dyer explained, ―Healthy Spot customers care about their 
dogs, so co-owners Andrew Kim and Mark Boonnark didn‘t think it was too far of a stretch to ask 
them to donate to dogs a little less fortunate than their own.‖ Id.  
 The options available to the customer following such a request are limited, as captured by one 
blogger‘s sarcastic observations regarding a request to add a dollar for the Make-A-Wish Foundation: 
―What can I say? No way. I am a monster. I hate dying children. I also worship the devil and kick 
babies for fun.‖ Laura Gunderson, Safeway Fund-Raising: Need Change?, OREGONLIVE.COM: 
COMPLAINT DESK (July 25, 2008, 11:14 AM), available at http://blog.oregonlive.com/complaint 
desk/2008/07/safeway_fundraising_need_chang.html (quoting an anonymous blogger). Moreover, the 
checkout clerk may not act appropriately should you refuse to donate. See Strom, Charity’s Share, 
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point had a small placard with one, two, and five dollar pull away coupons 
good towards a worthy cause like feeding the homeless or global food 
aid—the request is usually placed in such a way that all customers will 
have to choose whether to ignore the request or add a contribution to their 
purchase.
188
 Whether they are paying for a coupon with a bar code, a 
sticker, or a small mock bag of wheat, the end-of-the-aisle donation is a 
call to conscience that the checkout employee sometimes will even ask 
customers about directly.
189
 And the same sort of charitable giving is being 
requested beyond the checkout line: some monthly utility bills now urge 
customers to donate money through the utility company so that the poor 
may receive water or electric assistance.
190
 The common denominator of 
these practices is that the poverty-related charitable cause chosen usually 
relates to the purchases being made and supports a cause with broad 
appeal.  
Poverty offsetting responds to growing consumer awareness that 
consumption cannot be seen as an isolated event and instead can reflect 
both exploitive production processes and, arguably, societal inequality. 
Unlike environmental offsetting where the market has developed a range 
of options with formally established offsetting brokers and facilitators, 
poverty offsetting as it currently exists is haphazard and cannot yet be 
easily identified as offsetting. The first half of this Part is an explanation 
of why consumers are—or should be—motivated to make poverty 
offsetting payments in connection with their consumption. The second half 
argues that the discrete practices of post-consumption poverty offsetting 
should be better institutionalized. What is now an ad hoc phenomenon of 
businesses and consumers should be strengthened by drawing upon 
 
 
supra note 71 (reporting on a customer whose bananas were treated roughly by a Whole Foods clerk 
after the customer refused to make a donation to a breast cancer charity). 
 188. Another example is a Staples campaign to take advantage of the start of the school year to get 
―better-off students to donate 11 ‗most needed‘ school supplies‖ to help poor American 
schoolchildren. Stuart Elliot, Giving Back, by Backpack, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/business/media/13adnewsletter1.html.  
 189. For example, Randalls Supermarket in Austin, Texas supports a local food bank by having 
tellers ask customers if they would like to donate. Michael May, Overwhelmed by Check-Out-Line 
Charity, MARKETPLACE MONEY (Jan. 1, 2010), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/ 
01/01/mm-checkoutcharity. Randalls offers three giving choices; give a dollar, give five dollars, or pay 
for a bag of groceries to be delivered to the food bank. Id. It is worth noting the degree to which the 
final option is self-serving; the grocery store presumably is not selling the groceries at cost.  
 190. Although slightly removed from the checkout-line request, online giving in some instances 
might reflect individual offsetting as well by people who first make an online purchase or by those 
who return home and feel the need to make a donation following their consumption. For more on the 
rise of online donations and international aid contributed by individuals, see Desai & Kharas, supra 
note 103.  
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consumer knowledge of consumption harms and providing consumers the 
opportunity to effectively offset those harms. I argue for the creation of an 
offsetting mechanism that would facilitate payments and help inculcate the 
custom of making poverty offset payments following consumption.  
1. Motivating Factors 
Underlying poverty offsetting behavior is a desire by consumers to 
correct for production and consumption externalities. By placing the 
opportunity to donate at the end of checkout lines or on routine invoices, 
charities make acting upon this corrective inclination easy. But while ease 
of payment increases the probability people will donate, ease alone does 
not translate into donations unless people already want to give money. 
Before considering the existing mechanisms and potential institutions for 
poverty offsetting, we need to understand what consumers are correcting 
for and why they are willing to pay a certain amount for a product and 
then make a separate donation on top of that amount.  
Individuals‘ willingness-to-offset is informed by a number of generally 
overlapping intuitions and behaviors. First, consumers have some 
knowledge of market failures and governance vacuums associated with 
their consumption. Second, charitable donations following consumption, 
at times, are examples of individuals voluntarily relinquishing a portion of 
their consumer surplus. Finally, individual offsetting payments reflect 
social pressure at a moment where inequality and ability-to-pay are 
particularly evident.  
First, knowledge of market failures, especially those caused by 
governance vacuums, perhaps best explains why consumers are—and 
should be—motivated to make poverty offsetting payments. Individuals 
feel the need to make environmental offset payments in part because the 
atmospheric costs of greenhouse gas emissions are not priced into goods 
or services. The price of an airline ticket reflects the fact that there is no 
ownership, collective or individual, over environmental goods or harms—
a classic governance vacuum. The same can be said of poverty-related 
harms permitted by governance vacuums. If an individual wants to be 
carbon neutral or at least reduce harm associated with airline travel, an 
offset payment can be made. An individual who disapproves of a good‘s 
production process because it fails to take into account a social harm 
connected to poverty or inequality similarly can use an offset payment to 
correct or reduce the harm of his or her consumption. Because offsetting is 
a voluntary activity, consumer perceptions and knowledge of social harm 
caused by governance vacuums or other market failures can be 
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determinative even if there is not general acceptance of either the harm or 
that a particular production process is to blame.  
True-believers in the idea and benefits of the free market will recoil at 
the possibility that consumption can be causally related to social harms, in 
particular poverty. Proponents of laissez-faire capitalism generally 
acknowledge the harms of slavery and other forms of forced labor, but do 
not extend such recognition to cases where workers are formally 
empowered but subject to nearly impossible choices. Once participation in 
global capitalism is premised on free-labor standards that include the right 
of workers to voluntarily enter into, and exit, employment contracts, how 
can we say they have been harmed by consumption? For reasons discussed 
elsewhere in this paper, consumption-driven capitalism deserves 
tremendous praise and credit as an anti-poverty tool.
191
 But such welfare 
gains do not diminish the hardships encountered by those with formal 
freedom but without meaningful opportunities to choose their own path.
192
 
For socially conscious consumers, the solution is not to opt out of the 
market but to correct as much as possible for social harms that continue to 
be associated with consumption of particular goods.  
Perhaps counterintuitively, the connection between consumption and 
social harms is less accepted than environmental harms. The scientific 
community has struggled to bring about a certain cursory awareness 
among consumers about the connection between consumption and 
environmental degradation. The same cannot be said as easily of poverty-
related social harms, where causal connections between consumption and 
harm are blurred by class and societal distance. When an anti-sweatshop 
campaign produces a report documenting abusive working conditions and 
inadequate compensation, the impact is dulled by the life space between 
consumers and workers. Consumers, particularly those with faith in 
markets, can easily rationalize the working conditions: maybe relative to 
other options in that country, work in the factory is good; somebody will 
solve this problem, it isn’t my concern; and/or I couldn’t live like that, but 
maybe they are happy. All of these rationalizations may have an element 
of truth, but they overlook the possibility of absolute deprivations of 
human rights or absolute social harms that should not be subject to 
discounting based on relative experiences. Additionally, perceptions of 
worker happiness, lack of better alternatives, and corrective actions by 
 
 
 191. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.  
 192. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE 
LEGAL IMAGINATION 124–25 (2010) (discussing Amaryta Sen‘s distinction between formal ―process 
freedom‖ and the ―opportunity aspect of freedom‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 81 
 
 
 
 
others need not be based on consumer knowledge to have a rationalizing 
effect. Assumptions that rely upon stereotypes of foreign societies or the 
developing world can satisfy the mental need to excuse one‘s indifference 
to poor working conditions.  
Consumer hesitation to recognize social harms tied to poverty reflects a 
general propensity of Americans to blame the poor for their poverty. 
Endangered animals are by their nature ―innocent,‖ but the idea that 
through hard work people can lift themselves out of poverty makes the 
poor ―guilty‖ or at least complicit in their hardships. If the poor only 
studied, worked, or saved more, the thinking goes for many Americans, 
they would not be so poor.
193
 Put differently, the iconic American hero, the 
self-made man of Horatio Alger mythology, requires its antithesis. The 
lift-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps ideology is mentally contrasted with a 
stereotyped example of the undeserving individual, often female, whose 
laziness, welfare reliance, and minority racial status make him or her 
unworthy of charity or sympathy.
194
 The structural causes of poverty, 
though acknowledged by Europeans, are brushed over by Americans, who 
instead attribute poverty to individual failings.
195
 Finally, opportunities to 
question the notion that the poor deserve to be poor are limited by the 
disconnect between consumers with disposable income and the poor. 
Increasing inequality and separation of classes—whether in the absence of 
cross-class social capital or in the physical separation of lived space made 
possible by the withdrawal of the rich into private enclaves—reinforces 
the idea that poverty reflects individual choices not structural 
impediments.
196
 Given American societal faith in the possibility of upward 
mobility through hard work and belief in the undeserving nature of the 
poor, recognizing social harms connecting consumption to poverty 
arguably requires more of consumers than does recognition of 
consumption‘s environmental harms.  
 
 
 193. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Getting to Know the Poor, 144 (unpublished manuscript) (forthcoming 
14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 2011) [hereinafter Rosser, Getting to Know the Poor] (highlighting 
anti-poor rhethoric used in a debate about welfare reform).  
 194. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1499, 1502–08 (1991).  
 195. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN 
POOR 149–82 (1996).  
 196. For more on characterizations of the poor as undeserving and the structural causes of poverty, 
see HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 
(1995). See also Amy L. Wax, Musical Chairs and Tall Buildings: Teaching Poverty Law in the 21st 
Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363 (2007) (providing a great overview of the structure/undeserving 
debates that surround welfare policy); Rosser, Getting to Know the Poor, supra note 193, at 127–36.  
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Consumer recognition of social harms connected with consumption 
nevertheless seems to transcend the many rationalizations for indifference 
and the idea that the poor are undeserving. The second motivation for 
poverty offsetting, the willingness of consumers to voluntarily relinquish a 
portion of the consumer surplus, perhaps helps explain the practice of 
making charitable donations connected with consumption. For while 
narratives rationalizing separation and blaming the poor are powerful 
demotivators, consumers may still want to hedge against the possibility 
that their consumption is harm-inducing. In the context of uncertainty 
regarding production processes and structural origins of poverty, the 
consumer surplus makes a precautionary approach to harm possible. I am 
going start with an economic explanation of the consumer surplus 
followed by an unconventional way to understand the surplus.  
In any market transaction, price is determined by the mutual agreement 
of seller and buyer. Aggregating the amount buyers are willing to pay for a 
particular product and the amount producers are willing to sell at particular 
price points generates the typical intersection of demand and supply. See 
Figure 2 below: 
FIGURE 2: CONSUMER SURPLUS 
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A consumer surplus exists because of the inability of sellers to 
effectively engage in price discrimination. The person who most wants the 
product, understood in terms of willingness-to-pay, would have paid an 
amount in excess of the market-determined price. (The corresponding 
producer surplus captures the willingness of some suppliers to sell the 
good at an amount below the market price.) Legal limitations and the 
transaction costs involved in individually negotiating the price for each 
unit sold prevent producers from fully capturing consumer willingness-to-
pay. The welfare gain experienced through the consumer surplus can be 
thought of as an unpaid-for benefit of the market structure. This benefit is 
captured in FIGURE 2 above by the space where demand exceeds price.  
The economic description of consumer surplus, despite the advantage 
of a nice model, fails to capture the emotional response of consumers to 
the consumer surplus. For small items the welfare gain may go unnoticed. 
If my sweet tooth makes me willing to pay 75¢ for a candy bar but I am 
only charged 50 cents, my savings relative to my willingness-to-pay is 
high as a percentage but may not be something I think about for too long. 
On the other hand, if I really want a particular pair of shoes and would 
have paid $100 for them but find them at an outlet for $30, I will probably 
leave the store noticeably happier. The same can be said of baskets of 
goods. If a new discount grocery store opens, as I pick out individual items 
I may not fully appreciate the savings, but when I check out and see a 
much-reduced total bill, I may experience similar happiness based on the 
aggregate benefit. The happiness connected to the consumer surplus can 
reflect consumption emotions associated with particular purchases—
―wow, what a great deal‖ or ―what a steal!‖ But these feelings can also be 
experienced in the aggregate, where perhaps the offsetting motive can best 
be connected to charitable giving.  
Paradoxically, just as the idea that the poor are undeserving may mute 
offsetting, the sense that consumers are themselves undeserving of their 
privilege may inspire offsetting. Introspection or guilty feelings can make 
consumers question their good fortune and societal support for their 
consumption.
197
 Such emotions can be positively translated into action 
through charitable giving or other ways of ―giving back,‖ but it would be 
wrong to discount the unease generated by a substantial aggregate 
consumer surplus. As an activity, consumption provides individuals an 
opportunity to recognize relative privilege and good fortune. For, despite 
 
 
 197. In an earlier article, I explored the relationship between societal support for income, which 
implicitly includes consumption, and obligations to the poor. See Ezra Rosser, Obligations of 
Privilege, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2007).  
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American society‘s celebration of high incomes as reflective of 
individuals‘ non-economic worth, in a world of scarcity the ability to 
consume not enjoyed by all raises the linked possibilities that the 
consumer is enjoying too great a surplus and that surplus is undeserved. 
Offsetting enables consumers to voluntarily relinquish a portion of their 
consumer surplus. Making an offset pushes the amount paid closer to the 
amount of consumers‘ individualized willingness-to-pay and lessens the 
feelings that a purchase is undeserved. Consumers in a sense engage in 
voluntary price discrimination, with the offset portion going towards 
charity rather than the producer. The consumer surplus can explain in part 
a willingness to make an offset payment, but should not be confused for 
the reason offsetting is warranted in the first place. When consumption is 
not linked to negative externalities, there is nothing to be offset, regardless 
of whether the consumer enjoys a large surplus. On the flip side, 
consumers are not excused from an obligation to correct for consumption 
harms just because the consumer surplus is small for a particular purchase.  
Social pressure to give to charity, the third offset motivator, operates 
indirectly to inspire offset payments. Social pressure in the context of 
consumption offsetting works because of our need to be viewed as 
contributing members of society and to avoid feelings of shame. The 
response of one Safeway shopper to a checkout-line-request highlights this 
pressure: ―They ask you—in a loud voice, often, in front of a whole line of 
people—and if you don‘t give, you sound like a doofus.‖198 After a big 
purchase or payment, inequality and good fortune is apparent to others; 
consequently, consumers may bow to pressure to make a donation. A 
small donation may be preferable to revealing indifference to a particular 
cause and larger donations can buy esteem. Fundraisers routinely employ 
social pressure to increase charitable giving, and public attention to levels 
of giving can increase giving.
199
 Though caving to social pressure does not 
seem as worthy of celebration as pure altruism or even knowledge of 
production governance vacuums, the transformative potential of social 
 
 
 198. Laura Gunderson, Safeway Fund-Raising: Need Change?, OREGONLIVE.COM: COMPLAINT 
DESK (July 25, 2008, 11:14 AM), available at http://blog.oregonlive.com/complaintdesk/2008/07/ 
safeway_fundraising_need_chang.html (quoting Benni Copelin, a Safeway shopper upset about 
embedded giving).  
 199. Warren Buffett and Bill and Melinda Gates, for example, created The Giving Pledge, 
http://givingpledge.org, a listing of billionaires who have promised to give away more than half of 
their wealth. The public nature of the pledges, complete with testimonials, calls attention to the good 
deeds of those making the pledge and arguably puts social pressure on those billionaires who are 
notably absent from the list. For more on The Giving Pledge, see Paul Sullivan, Pledging Fortunes 
Takes Extra Effort in Shaky Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/08/14/your-money/14wealth.html.  
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pressure should not be denied.
200
 Guilt, coupled with knowledge of what 
others are doing, may be the most effective motivator.
201
 What begins as a 
generalized consumer response to social pressure can morph into social 
expectations internalized by consumers.
202
 Simply asking for charitable 
donations following consumption can help generate the norm of making 
such contributions.  
Pressure to give following consumption might be particularly effective 
because it catches people with their wallet open. Depending on the goods 
purchased—if luxury goods are purchased compared to basic necessities—
the pressure is also applied immediately following a public demonstration 
that the individual has disposable income that could go towards charitable 
causes, occurring at the moment of purchase. The practice of the indigent 
to proposition shoppers as they exit stores reflects the ―vulnerability‖ or 
―susceptibility‖ of consumers to requests for charity immediately 
following a purchase. At the post-consumption moment, consumers may 
be receptive even to automated requests.
203
 Where the request is made for 
giving that corrects for consumption or production externalities, an 
 
 
 200. Social pressure can be felt indirectly. In a study of energy conservation, customers who 
―learned that the vast majority of their neighbors were conserving‖ ended up conserving more than 
they did ―when they were told about environmental benefits or about personal cost savings.‖ Rhode & 
Ross, supra note 34, at 179. This can be explained in part by aversion to ―extremeness‖: people ―prefer 
to behave as others behave and to believe as others believe.‖ Ela, supra note 6, at 105. Social pressure 
to conserve energy can even make people reduce the time they spend in the shower. See Sara Rimer, 
How Green Is the College? Time the Showers, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008 at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/education/26green.html.  
 201. See Stephanie Simon, The Secret to Turning Consumers Green: It Isn’t Financial Incentives. 
It Isn’t More Information. It’s Guilt., WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2010, available at http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB10001424052748704575304575296243891721972.html (discussing environmental 
campaigns using information on the practices of others to inspire lifestyle changes).  
 202. Tipping is the classic case of individuals making payments that do not make sense according 
to narrowly defined self-interest. As anyone who has traveled knows, tipping expectations vary by 
location, but the question remains, why do people tip? When you go to your favorite local restaurant, 
tipping makes logical sense—your repeated interactions at the restaurant police your tipping, adequate 
tipping helps guarantee good food and good service in the future. When traveling to a place where you 
expect to return infrequently, if at all, these incentives to tip disappear, yet studies show people 
continue to tip. The travel-tipping phenomenon seems to reflect both social pressure felt even from 
strangers and the internalization of such pressures. For more on tipping and how tipping relates to 
offsetting, see Rosser, Poverty Offsetting, supra note 4, at 6–8.  
 203. The susceptibility to charitable requests, even ones made by a machine, following purchases 
is captured by the following commentary:  
 On my recent trip to the grocery store, I swiped my card and the machine asked me if I‘d 
like to make a donation to People With Disabilities. It‘s a smart way for charities to solicit 
donations because people are already spending money, and adding an extra $5 to the bill 
doesn‘t seem like much when you‘re already shelling out $100. 
Have You Made a Donation at the Grocery Store Checkout?, SAVVYSUGAR (Apr. 29, 2009, 4:30 AM), 
http://www.savvysugar.com/Have-You-Made-Donation-Grocery-Store-Checkout-3090853 (emphasis 
added).  
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offsetting norm can emerge or be strengthened by such social pressure, 
even if at first the consumer experiences the pressure as discomfort.  
The reasons why consumers make offset payments inform how 
offsetting institutions could be improved. As with any complex behavior, 
clean lines and perfect separation of these motivations—knowledge of 
market failures and governance vacuums, available consumer surplus, and 
social pressure—is probably impossible and not particularly useful. The 
central insight is the observation that just as some consumers are inspired 
to offset environmental harms, consumers often recognize, or should 
recognize, reasons to offset poverty-related social harms of consumption.  
2. Institutional Improvements 
Despite the good reasons for individuals to practice poverty offsetting 
and the options currently available for doing so—particularly the 
checkout-line-request—more is needed. For offsetting to play a 
meaningful role in having the privileged act upon obligations to the poor, 
ad hoc poverty offsetting must make way for a more comprehensive 
consumption offset scheme. An offsetting scheme signals to consumers 
both the possibility that they wrongly benefited from the poverty of others 
through their consumption—most notably individual producers not paid a 
living wage—and that they should offset the harms of their consumption. 
Such offsets would thus establish a floor, a minimum level of individual 
obligation based on personal spending habits, for alleviating global 
poverty and hardships. In this Part, I sketch out—in the hopes that this 
outline will generate discussion—answers to the central questions of any 
poverty offset scheme: what sort of consumption would be offset and how 
would the offset be accomplished? 
Poverty offsetting should correct for situations where there is a causal 
relationship between an individual‘s consumption and poverty. In 
establishing what would be covered by an offsetting scheme, it is 
important to identify what would fall outside of the offsetting framework. 
Offsetting would be limited to payments of the amount needed to correct 
for production externalities and governance vacuums. Developing a 
culture of offsetting would involve significant norm changes among 
consumers who would have to become aware of, and voluntarily accept, 
additional responsibilities for the consequences of consumption.
204
 Given 
 
 
 204. Providing information about the connection between consumption and harm is an important 
first step in these norm changes. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 181, at 1709 (―Studies 
suggest that individuals respond to information not just about the harms arising from their specific 
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the nascent and ad hoc state of offsetting today, establishing a vision for 
the direction of institutional change is more important than defending a 
particular set of offsetting institutional rules.  
Offsetting asks that consumers correct for known externalities and 
governance vacuums that result in the price of a good or service being 
falsely discounted. Production externalities and governance vacuums can 
leave individuals to live in poverty, a fact that forces consumers with a 
conscience to consider making voluntary corrective payments. Poverty-
related production externalities and governance vacuum examples abound: 
(1) when a company pollutes an area, decimating the local economy and 
leaving workers without a way to earn a living;
205
 (2) when a company 
employing people of lower socioeconomic status routinely engages in 
wage theft;
206
 (3) when a country allows the creation of a class of workers 
and denies them basic securities and legal protections;
207
 (4) when a 
company‘s staunch anti-union practices block employee efforts to engage 
in collective bargaining;
208
 and (5) when producers, at home or abroad, fail 
to provide workers with humane working conditions or a living wage.
209
 
The list goes on and on, with examples that are at once both particular and 
 
 
activities but also about the harms arising from the aggregate activities of all individuals.‖).  
 205. This example was suggested by the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico during summer 2010 and the effect the spill could and did have on local fisherman. See 
generally NAT‘L COMM‘N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf.  
 206. See, e.g., KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS 
ARE NOT GETTING PAID – AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2009); Julien Ross, A Fair Day’s Pay: 
The Problem of Unpaid Workers in Central Texas, 10 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL‘Y 117, 119–22 (2004). 
For a recent multi-district case involving claims of wage theft against Wal-Mart that shows the 
challenges of holding companies accountable, see In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Employment 
Practices Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Nev. 2007), and subsequent history.  
 207. The literature on the problems of U.S. immigration policy is massive and beyond the scope of 
this Article, but President Obama‘s recent speech on immigration provides a useful overview of the 
issues. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
(July 1, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehen 
sive-immigration-reform.  
 208. Wal-Mart is particularly notable because of the company‘s importance in the economy and 
its success fighting union activity. See Nelson Lichtenstein, How Wal-Mart Fights Unions, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 1462 (2008). Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart also indirectly harms unionization efforts in 
competitor stores as well. See Merritt Quisumbing, Corporate Responsibility and Labor: Choosing 
Where to Buy Groceries: The High Price of Wal-Mart’s “Always Low Prices. Always.”®, 7 J.L. & 
SOC. CHALLENGES 111 (2005).  
 209. Donna Karen International, Inc., for example, was sued by sweatshop workers who ―were 
paid below minimum wage and worked long hours under difficult conditions.‖ Orly Lobel, Big-Box 
Benefits: The Targeting of Giants in a National Campaign to Raise Work Conditions, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1685, 1689 (2007).  
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universal, as global capitalism pushes prices down.
210
 Consumers with 
knowledge of these practices that deny people a life free of poverty have a 
choice. They can ignore the connection between their consumption and the 
poverty of others or they can choose to act.  
But why make an offsetting payment? Why not put one‘s efforts into 
political solutions? Almost by definition, governance vacuums that 
relegate individuals to poverty could be fixed by politics. We could better 
police environmental catastrophes and require compensation to those 
harmed, enforce wage theft laws, recognize the contributions of 
immigrants through legalization of status, protect the rights of workers to 
unionize, and require goods sold in the U.S. be produced with fair working 
conditions and with minimum wages set at a living wage rate, not a 
poverty wage rate. That all of these things are possible through politics, 
however, does not address the individual‘s personal benefit from existing 
rules that keep prices low by consigning people to poverty. It is not 
either/or—either make an offset payment or seek political change. Rather, 
offsetting asks that consumers recognize the unjust enrichment aspect of 
their consumption made possible by governance vacuums and make an 
offsetting payment.
211
  
Not all purchases require a poverty offset; goods produced and sold in 
ways that do not cause or perpetuate poverty would be outside of any 
poverty offset scheme. This standard for exclusion is demanding. So far, I 
have focused largely on production and producers, but consumers should 
also be concerned about the practices of middlemen who sell goods 
produced by others. Just because a consumer buys a shoe, for example, 
that is made in a factory with good working conditions and pay for 
employees does not mean the price that consumer pays is a fair one if the 
store that sells the shoes pays employees a pittance. The area of concern 
includes everything from suppliers of raw materials to producers to 
 
 
 210. Karbowski, supra note 50, at 734 (―Globalization has created new opportunities for human 
rights abuses to occur. . . . as the pressure to keep production prices low has impacted producers‘ 
willingness to expend more resources by providing adequate protections for their workers.‖); Roberts, 
supra note 3, at 10 (―[B]ecause consumers seek goods for lower prices, market competition 
incentivizes firms to deliver goods and services for lower prices to retain those customers. To reduce 
their costs, firms must either become less wasteful or shift those costs to others. When countries lack 
labor regulation or the means to enforce the regulation, firms may use their market power to lower 
wages, refuse to pay wages, pay discount wages to child laborers or extend working hours and 
requirements.‖).  
 211. The relationship between individual consumers and regulation of large emitters provides a 
useful analogy. The possibility that major reductions in emissions could be accomplished through 
regulation of large emitters does not excuse individuals from their responsibility to reduce emissions, 
and vice versa. Cf. Dernbach, supra note 94, at 127–28. Similarly, political possibilities do not excuse 
consumers of their other individual consumption-based responsibilities.  
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commercial vendors. If offsetting was linked to individual products, an 
independently verified labeling scheme regarding production to final sale 
would help establish which purchases should be excluded from offsetting.  
On the other hand, aggregating poverty offsetting based on average 
product harm and overall consumption level offers a practical way of 
facilitating offset payments. Building off of the environmental offsetting 
model of using flight distance or car type to calculate carbon emissions, 
using average harm tied to particular consumption levels will make it 
easier for consumers to make meaningful offsetting payments.
212
 As 
discussed in Part I, it is almost impossible for consumers to have full 
knowledge of production processes, but such ignorance on the individual 
product level need not block offsetting. A basket approach that takes into 
account where products are produced, the regulatory environment, and the 
treatment of workers could serve as a proxy for perfect information. Using 
an average harm of consumption measure, a baseline level of offsetting 
could be established that would be adjusted upward for individuals as 
consumption increased. Although the reasons for offsetting—to correct for 
harms associated with consumption—should not be lost, there is real value 
in making offsetting easier to accomplish and in not having the wheels of 
capitalism be ground to a halt by offset calculations. A well-designed 
offset scheme should build upon the transformative power of capitalism, 
strengthening capitalism‘s role as an important mechanism in the fight 
against poverty.
213
 Simplifying offsetting from a product-by-product 
 
 
 212. An entrant in the 2009 International Council on Shopping Centers convention‘s Future Image 
Architecture Competition included consumption level offsetting as part of a mall design. Colman 
Architects‘ Retail Galleries concept features the ―One World Desk‖ to facilitate customer donating ―a 
percentage of their purchase price to charity.‖ Allison Arieff, Rethinking the Mall, NYTIMES.COM: 
OPINIONATOR (June 1, 2009, 10:25 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/rethinking-
the-mall.  
 213. The complex relationship between capitalism and global poverty was captured by Bill Gates, 
who began a Time Magazine contribution by noting, ―Capitalism has improved the lives of billions of 
people—something that‘s easy to forget at a time of great economic uncertainty. But it has left out 
billions more.‖ Bill Gates, Making Capitalism More Creative, TIME MAG., July 31, 2008, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1828069,00.html. Gates argues that private 
companies and private enterprise, by either reaching the market at the bottom of the class pyramid or 
through targeted government incentives, can solve many of the most pressing social problems. Id. For 
Gates, ―[c]reative capitalism . . . is a way to answer a vital question: How can we most effectively 
spread the benefits of capitalism and the huge improvements in quality of life it can provide to people 
who have been left out?‖ Id. Gates‘ vision includes space for government and non-profits, but seeks to 
bring the dynamism and work of entrepreneurs to bear on the problems faced by those excluded from 
the system. Id. For a less qualified celebration of capitalism‘s role in reducing global poverty, see 
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Twentieth-Century Political Economy: A Brief History of Global Capitalism, 15 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL‘Y 90 (1999) (strenuously arguing that a capitalist orientation helps countries 
develop and communism amounted to a costly detour for countries that went that direction).  
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approach to an average-based approach allows consumers to become 
accustomed to offsetting and improves offsetting‘s institutional efficiency.  
The connection between purchase and the charitable solicitation 
following purchase shares the general ad hoc nature of poverty offsetting‘s 
current form. The charity often, but not always, relates in some way to the 
type of store; the money raised often, but not always, benefits people 
whose livelihood is connected to the products purchased; and the 
solicitation materials often, but not always, describe how the money raised 
will be spent. It is time for the establishment of an overarching poverty 
offsetting institution that collects a single annual offset payment and 
distributes funds systematically.
214
 Such an institution would provide 
consumers assurance that funds collected were used to correct for 
consumptive harms.
215
 Institutional scale would increase transparency and 
protect against both duplicative efforts and populations of disadvantaged 
workers being overlooked. Poverty-related harms do not enjoy the same 
fungibility as is found in the carbon context, yet establishing and operating 
an offset scheme tying every purchase to its particular related harms would 
be prohibitively expensive. The uniqueness of poverty harm provides 
further justification for a basket approach organized by an umbrella 
institution. As with any institution, there are dangers—that administrative 
expenses would be too high, that funds would not be used appropriately, 
that there will be mission drift—but such downside risks do not diminish 
the promise of establishing a poverty offsetting institution.
216
  
Local and global poverty imposes seemingly boundless, unworkable 
obligations on individuals with financial resources.
217
 The idea behind 
 
 
 214. The flexibility and donor-funded nature of such an institution does not mean that there is no 
need for regulatory oversight protective of consumer expectations when paying for offsets. Just as the 
expansive growth and newness of peer-to-peer development finance organizations should be coupled 
with an appropriate regulatory framework, see Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer 
Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 1209 (2010) 
(providing regulatory recommendations for peer-to-peer institutions such as Kiva), so too an umbrella 
offset institution should be regulated. 
 215. Additionally, a single institution would make it easier for individuals to claim charitable tax 
deductions. See also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 230 (proposing a ―Charity Debit Card‖ to 
make accounting for charitable giving easier).  
 216. Following successful institutional development and norm adaptation to standard poverty 
offsetting, there might be space for a more robust version of offsetting that takes into account indirect 
impacts of consumption. Standard offsetting is qualitatively limited to the harm caused by market 
failures and governance vacuums in the production and sale process. Missing from such offsetting are 
the indirect harms that result from societal inequality, which individuals participate in through their 
consumption. For an argument that individual participation in such inequality is an economic crime, 
see Note, A Look Inward: Blurring the Moral Line Between the Wealthy Professional and the Typical 
Criminal, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2165 (2006).  
 217. The expansive argument of a recent Harvard Law Review Note—controversial for the idea 
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poverty offsetting suggests that at the very least we should attempt to 
correct for the poverty-causing or poverty-perpetuating aspects of our 
consumption. Though poverty offsetting behavior and the options 
available to consumers are both still in a nascent stage, work building on 
the emerging norm of donating to charity immediately following purchase 
holds the promise of connecting poverty alleviation to our consumption. 
Environmental offsetting deserves credit for exposing consumers to the 
ideas of externalities, consumption harm, and the possibility of making 
offsetting payments. Ironically, there is the danger that poverty offsetting 
could diminish environmental offsetting if consumers respond to an 
expansion in the scope of offsetting alternatives by choosing to offset 
poverty instead of environmental harms. But this need not be a case of 
competing social goods, for poverty and environmental offsetting can 
complement each other. Poverty offsetting asks that individuals recognize 
the poor as deserving the same acknowledgment of harm connected to 
consumption as is given the environment.  
III. OFFSETTING AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Offsetting can be thought of as a consumption indulgence, a payment 
for the forgiveness of sin.
218
 By its nature, such an analogy is suggestive of 
the criticisms and limitations of offsetting. This Part considers the 
downsides and objections to consumption offsets for environmental and 
poverty-related harms. Offsetting generates resources to offset or correct 
consumption-related harm. But the dangers exist that offsetting will be 
equated with innocence or that offset consumption indulgences will be 
sold on the cheap. More fundamentally, offsetting seems to amount to an 
embrace of consumerism that could amount to a sell-out of more radical 
ideas and the co-option of the socially responsible. I consider these 
objections but ultimately reject the notion that structural change must 
necessarily involve a tearing down of market exchange and a rejection of 
market mechanisms. Offsetting, I argue, can help awaken the social 
 
 
that the wealthy have to give far more to help the poor, the factual errors it contained, and its highly 
derivative character—highlights the possibly boundless nature of poverty-related obligations. See 
Note, Never Again Should a People Starve in a World of Plenty, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1886 (2008). The 
Note drew heavily upon the work of Peter Singer, even using a nearly identical hypothetical tailored to 
the law student population. See Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
229 (1972). For more on the controversy, see David Lat, A Few More Tidbits About the Harvard Law 
Review Note Controversy, ABOVE THE LAW (June 4, 2008, 4:28 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2008/06/ 
a-few-more-tidbits-about-the-harvard-law-review-note-controversy (collecting sources).  
 218. See, e.g., Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 160, at 854 (―Offsets have been labeled by some as 
papal indulgences . . . .‖).  
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consciousness and develop norms that will lead to increased recognition of 
non-consumption-based obligations.  
A. Capturing Guilty Wallets 
Offsetting should not be equated with innocence. Consumption-
associated harms do not cease to exist simply because an offset payment is 
made. A payment corrects for the initial harm related to consumption but 
does not prevent the infliction of harm. If I ignore my wife when she is 
talking to me, harm is inflicted even if I subsequently purchase flowers to 
make up for my insensitivity.
219
 Similarly, while one could pay TerraPass 
to offset the environmental harms of driving a low-gas-mileage SUV 
around the suburbs, the owner of the car is still consuming excessive 
gasoline and pumping large amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere. 
Offsetting schemes work by convincing people to voluntarily give money 
at the post-purchase moment when they might feel a particularly strong 
willingness-to-contribute. But just as my willingness to apologize to my 
wife does not mean the initial harm never occurred, it is inaccurate to 
equate offsetting with innocence.  
Offsetting is a way to correct for externalities and consumption harms 
but should not be thought of as a license to consume. I should not be 
allowed to litter by throwing empty soda cans out of my car simply 
because I make it a point to pick up the same number of littered empty 
cans.
220
 This relatively simple observation, unfortunately, has been lost on 
a number of politicians and Hollywood celebrities who have tried to use 
offsetting to excuse exorbitant levels of consumption.
221
 Popular attention 
 
 
 219. Cheatneutral.com makes this point in dramatic fashion. Cheatneutral.com, a parody website, 
pretends to sell an infidelity offset, offering cheaters the ability to offset their bad behavior by paying 
to support ―monogamy-boosting offset projects,‖ such as loving couples and single people. Offset Your 
Cheating, CHEATNEUTRAL, http://www.cheatneutral.com/offset_your_cheating/ (last visited Aug. 26, 
2011).  
 220. This example is a version of a littering example found in Ayres & Nalebuff, Environmental 
Atonement, supra note 172.  
 221. Cf. Note, Uncommon Goods, supra note 96, at 2086 (―One can achieve carbon neutrality 
despite living a life of excessive consumption; it does not matter if one is offsetting the minimal 
carbon produced by a hybrid car, or the substantial carbon produced by a private plane. In this way, the 
carbon market obscures the idea that the environmental ethic against wastefulness is not just about 
outcomes, but about an ethos—a type of character.‖).  
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to the hypocritical aspects of calling for protection of the environment or 
the poor while living a life marked by a high level of consumption, attests 
to the limits of offsetting.
222
 Some might write off public reactions against 
offsetting by the rich and famous, even for high levels of consumption, as 
merely reflecting the conceptual distance offsetting still needs to span until 
Americans accept and appreciate the practice. But popular rejections of the 
idea that, by paying for an offset, consumers can be forgiven for excessive 
harm-causing consumption highlight an important limitation on offsetting 
practices. Making an offsetting payment following consumption may be 
better than simply consuming without making a payment, but socially 
conscious consumers arguably ought to avoid consumption associated 
with harm as much as possible, regardless of the availability of offsetting 
options.
223
 Otherwise, offsetting would facilitate excessive consumption 
and wastefulness.
224
  
 
 
 222. Al Gore, John Travolta, and John Edwards stand out in this respect. The former Vice 
President ―uses 20 times as much electricity and natural gas at his Tennessee house than the national 
average.‖ Gregg Easterbrook, Al Gore’s Outsourcing Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at A23, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/09/opinion/09easterbrook.html. Easterbrook argues that 
Gore is not guilty of hypocrisy because he purchases offsets, but many other commentators disagree. 
Fox News, in particular, was not surprisingly particularly incensed, accusing Gore of ―sanctimoniously 
tut-tutting about how the average American‘s energy use is greedily off the charts‖ while 
simultaneously consuming far more energy and not actually purchasing his own carbon offsets, which 
are purchased for him by a company Gore co-founded. Steven Milloy, Al Gore’s Inconvenient Electric 
Bill, FOXNEWS (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,257958,00.html.  
 Even when not directly discussing offsetting, reporting that highlights excessive consumption is 
suggestive of offsetting‘s limitations. John Travolta‘s ―eco-hypocrisy‖ was chronicled, along with that 
of other celebrities, by London‘s The Sunday Times:  
John Travolta notoriously encouraged the British public to do its bit to fight global 
warming—after flying into London on one of his five, yes, five private jets (one of which is a 
Boeing 707). In 2006 his piloting hobby produced an estimated 800 tons of carbon emissions, 
more than a hundred times the output of the average Briton, according to the Carbon Trust. 
Jonathan Foreman, Taking the Private Jet to Copenhagen, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009, 
available at http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/celebrity/article6931572.ece. 
Similarly, a New York Times article on John Edwards that begins by discussing his efforts to rebuild 
New Orleans post-Katrina goes on to note Edwards‘ opulent lifestyle: 
Whenever you wrap yourself in the mantle of morality and conviction, however, even the 
smallest hypocrisy can leave an indelible stain. Edwards is, after all, a very wealthy man, 
given to some of the excesses that wealth allows. While Edwards was denouncing inequality 
across the land, he was also building, near Chapel Hill, the largest home in the county, a 
28,000-square-foot mansion with its own indoor basketball and squash courts. 
Matt Bai, The Poverty Platform, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/06/10/magazine/10edwards-t.html?pagewanted=1.  
 223. A Salon.com article notes that ―the best way to fight emissions is to prevent them in the first 
place, not offset them after they‘ve occurred.‖ Katharine Mieszkowski, Paying Off Our Global 
Warming Sins, SALON.COM (May 26, 2006, 8:10 PM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/ 
05/26/offsets. The article, however, also quotes Robert Day, a TerraPass customer, who calls offset 
purchases a ―small gesture‖ but goes on to explain that it is ―certainly better to do this than to do 
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A related danger of offsetting is that the indulgence will be sold too 
cheap or make relief too easy. Competition within the offset industry, for 
example, could incentivize offset providers to offer offsets at a falsely low 
price. Ideally, competition will lead offset providers towards more 
efficient ways to correct for the harmful effects of consumption and such 
efficiency gains can be passed along to consumers in the form of lower 
prices. For example, if it costs less to capture agricultural methane than to 
plant trees, an offset to a company using the more efficient carbon capture 
technology should cost less. The risk, however, is that rather than being 
based on more efficient offsetting technologies or processes to correct for 
environmental or poverty-related harms, providers will compete on price 
alone. Consumers would be paying for what they thought was an offset but 
would be getting ―offset light.‖  
Moreover, changes in the level of global economic activity can reduce 
the corrective impact of some forms of offsetting. The relationship 
between the current global recession and carbon emissions highlights the 
danger that offsets will be sold on the cheap or for services that do not 
have the desired effect. A consumer who bought an allowance for a ton of 
CO2 pollution and retired the permit is not offsetting their pollution unless 
there is unmet industrial demand to pollute. If the cap underlying the CO2 
allowance is initially set too high—above demand—purchasing carbon 
allowances will not necessarily change the amount emitted.
225
 Similarly, 
when there is a global economic downturn, as we are in the midst of now, 
factories do not produce as much and they consequently do not pollute as 
much.
226
 The downturn therefore reduces demand for CO2 allowances and 
may mean that the permit-based offset does not reduce global levels of 
pollution beyond what they would have been but for the offset payment. 
Conversely, a superheated level of global economic activity may make it 
 
 
nothing.‖ Id. As these quotes suggest, the challenge when considering offsetting versus non-
consumption is establishing the appropriate baseline.  
 224. See Nina Mazar & Chen-Bo Zhong, Do Green Products Make Us Better People?, 21 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 494 (2010) (reporting on a study finding purchasers of green products subsequently are 
more likely to cheat and steal); Note, Uncommon Goods, supra note 96 (critiquing offsetting on this 
ground). But see Kotchen, Offsetting Green Guilt, supra note 162, at 31 (―[T]he existing evidence 
suggests that people do not indulge in carbon emissions as a result of purchasing offsets.‖).  
 225. The market for tradable pollution rights ―is a function of where the government has set the 
overall cap,‖ and a high cap will allow companies to easily continue production. Sinden, supra note 
10, at 571.  
 226. Decreased pollution is not the end of the story; recessions can have a countervailing effect on 
environmental concern that may lead to political backtracking on environmental matters. See Matthew 
E. Kahn & Matthew J. Kotchen, Environmental Concern and the Business Cycle: The Chilling Effect 
of Recession (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16241, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16241.  
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harder to observe poverty-related consumption harms. Economic gains 
may allow offset providers to seemingly offset harms and to take credit for 
welfare gains that actually were caused by improvements in the general 
economic condition, not by the particular offset program.  
Reducing the risk that offsets will allow consumers to purchase relief 
too easily or too cheaply requires reaffirmation that the roots of offsetting 
lie in morality and in voluntary payments. The focus of offset providers 
and of consumers who feel the need to correct for their consumption-
related harms must be on actually accomplishing offsetting. Information 
on the programs of providers, coupled with independent auditing, can help 
consumers select among competing offset mechanisms.
227
 But to safeguard 
against the paired risks of falsely low offset prices and the acceptance of 
offsetting‘s equivalence to innocence, individuals perhaps should offset an 
amount greater than the definite harm connected to their consumption.
228
 
Doing so would protect the offset‘s effectiveness against excessive 
diminishment because of changed levels of economic activity. More 
importantly, a norm of paying some amount above recognized harm would 
serve as a signal that offsetting should not be considered a consumption 
indulgence.  
B. Acceptance of Consumerism and Structural Change 
The most damaging criticism of offsetting is that it amounts to 
acceptance of consumerism and implicitly a reduced role for the state. 
People are more than just consumers; yet, offsetting locates an obligation 
to the environment and the poor only in this singular aspect of 
personality.
229
 Rather than advocating for global citizenship and the 
concomitant obligations that come when we recognize our shared 
responsibility for the Earth and for other humans, offsetting seems to 
embrace consumerism and consumer identity.
230
 Such an embrace not only 
 
 
 227. Independent audits reduce the possibility that ―unscrupulous providers‖ will take advantage 
of the ―asymmetric information‖ problem that besets offset schemes. Kotchen, Offsetting Green Guilt, 
supra note 162, at 30 (focusing on carbon markets).  
 228. See Ayres & Nalebuff, Environmental Atonement, supra note 172 (suggesting ―a two-for-one 
norm is a good rule of thumb‖ for offsetting one‘s own pollution).  
 229. See Sagoff, supra note 139, at 1394 (―[W]e are not simply a group of consumers, nor are we 
bent on satisfying only self-regarding preferences.‖).  
 230. This embrace of a diminished form of citizenship was captured by a New York Times article 
on ―buycotting‖—the deliberate consumption of goods produced ethically or with an associated offset 
payment—that asked, ―[I]s consumption an exciting new form of citizenship? Or is it a sign of how 
corroded citizenship has become that shopping is the closest many of us are willing to come to 
worrying about labor laws, trade agreements, agricultural policy—about good old-fashioned politics?‖ 
Anand Giridharadas, Boycotts Minus the Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 10, 2009, available at 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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seems to excuse indifference to matters beyond consumption externalities, 
but also to accept a secondary role of the state in societal organization.
231
 
According to this skeptical view, offsetting is nothing but a sugar-coated 
version of capitalism; in the long run, the ―compassionate consumption‖ of 
offsetting prevents more meaningful change from occurring.
232
  
Consumption has become a unifying belief and shared experience of 
Americans. The rise of consumerism narrows identity, replacing who we 
are or what we do to the more limited matter of what we own.
233
 Offsetting 
proposals arguably amount to a form of selling out to consumerism, asking 
little more of people than that they correct for the direct harms of their 
consumption. By making even this stripped down level of responsibility 
into nothing more than another good to be purchased, offsetting 
proponents seem to be surrendering to consumerism.
234
 This criticism 
cannot be entirely refuted, but I think that rather than thinking of offsetting 
as selling out, it should be thought of as using the strengths of capitalism 
to correct for consumption harms. Rather than treating the role 
consumption plays in our lives dismissively, offsetting takes consumption 
seriously and attempts to improve upon current practices. Institutions that 
permit individuals to easily access a simplified payment system to correct 
for production and consumption externalities can work in part because 
they build upon existing market transaction mechanisms and are tied to 
particular purchases. Individuals making offset payments are both 
 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/weekinreview/11giridharadas.html. See also Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 
377, 380–86 (1998) (reviewing the literature on the consumer/citizen distinction).  
 231. See Dadush, supra note 75, at 1335.  
 232. This argument is similar to critiques that President George Bush‘s ―compassionate 
conservatism‖ was just disguised conservatism. See, e.g., Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based 
Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 167 (2002). But see Michael 
Gerson, Compassionate to the End, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/29/AR2008012902212.html (―President Bush . . . [did not] 
cast aside compassion and become the ‗same kind of Republican[.]‘‖).  
 233. Even if ―replacing‖ is too strong a word, consumerism has become integral to our politics 
and is acknowledged even by those who highlight the positive aspects of this change. See LIZABETH 
COHEN, A CONSUMERS‘ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 408 
(2003) (―Increasingly over this century, the economic behavior of consumption has become entwined 
with the rights and obligations of citizenship.‖). For a rich discussion of U.S. consumerist law framed 
as a comparison with Europe‘s relatively more robust producerist orientation, see James Q. Whitman, 
Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 354–64 (2007). 
See also Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 28–34 (1998) (highlighting the problems 
of a consumer orientation to city services).  
 234. See Kysar & Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 10833 (―[D]oes green consumption serve as a 
gateway to more direct political activity or as a commodified palliative to ensure the continuation of 
business as usual?‖); see also Eikenberry, supra note 71, at 54 (making the same point about 
consumption philanthropy generally).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/2
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consuming and, within the market framework, expressing their preferences 
in a way that can aspire towards collective voice.
235
 More importantly, 
while some people may conclude that their responsibilities to the 
environment or the poor extend no further than making offset payments, 
there is nothing about offsetting that supports such a conclusion.
236
 
Offsetting rests on a responsibility floor—you should correct for harms 
associated with your consumption—but allows for recognition of 
heightened obligations tied to other criteria.
237
  
The emerging norm of offsetting carbon consumption provides an 
opportunity to expand awareness of consumption harms and use that 
knowledge to convince people to act. Offsetting accordingly can be 
thought of as a pragmatic response to the problems of global warming and 
poverty. Pragmatism lacks the drama and ideological purity of unifying 
political theories espoused by Marxists or laissez-faire economists, but it 
offers the possibility to make progress on social problems that are being 
allowed to fester. The response—―What about the state?‖—is not 
satisfying in a world without a deus ex machina.
238
 While state solutions 
are needed on local and global levels, individuals cannot take comfort in 
the theoretical possibility of state solutions when it comes to their own 
consumption-related harms.
239
 Beyond the individual level, offsetting 
provides an institutional mechanism for correcting for harm without 
asking all solutions come from politics or, more radically, the complete 
abandonment of capitalism.
240
 Offsetting reflects the common experience 
 
 
 235. See also Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, supra note 46, at 
2160 (arguing that responsible consumption accepts the centrality of individual choice but not market 
liberalism‘s separation of efficiency from other values).  
 236. But see Note, Uncommon Goods, supra note 96, at 2075 (arguing that offsetting‘s focus on 
efficient consumption could displace environmental virtues).  
 237. Vandenbergh and Steinemann, for example, argue that environmental offsetting ―squares 
well with the abstract personal-responsibility norm: it enables individuals to be confident that 
regardless of others‘ behavior, they are not contributing to the harm.‖ Vandenbergh & Steinemann, 
supra note 181, at 1720. But they also note the possibility of a ―carbon negative‖ norm in developed 
countries ―to account for the needs of the developing world.‖ Id. (emphasis in original).  
 238. Or as stated differently, market opponents often rely upon what William Easterly calls 
―Immaculate Government Intervention.‖ William Easterly, A High-Five for the Invisible Hand, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/books/review/Easterly-t.html.  
 239. One theoretical approach to consumption-related harm, not being advocated here, mixes the 
state and consumers by creating a legal mechanism for individuals to enter into self-restriction 
contracts with the state. Individuals would pre-commit to limit consumption or make offsetting 
payments and these voluntary commitments would be enforced by the state. For more on state 
enforcement of self-restriction contracts, see Cecil VanDevender, Note, How Self-Restriction Laws 
Can Influence Societal Norms and Address Problems of Bounded Rationality, 96 GEO. L.J. 1775 
(2008).  
 240. Norms, including offsetting norms, may allow for progress to be made where ―transaction 
costs or political realities render other regulatory techniques . . . ineffective or politically unpalatable.‖ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that when one is driving towards a goal, sometimes it is best to find the 
gap in the traffic.
241
  
A related critique of offsetting is that the phenomenon will delay 
popular enlightenment to the disastrous consequences of capitalism, the 
dominant global meta-structure. According to this view, offset payments 
delay or prevent recognition of the harms associated with our culture of 
consumption.
242
 More radical theorists may hope for a collapse or 
implosion of the larger structure; offset-type tinkering may smooth out 
capitalism‘s rough edges and so block revolutionary change.243 The 
trouble with this argument is that it does not admit the possibility of 
alternative paths of change other than through crisis. By drawing attention 
to the harms associated with consumption and how prices are currently 
below what they would be if producers had to internalize these 
externalities, offsetting forces consumers to reconsider their place in the 
market.
244
 Offsetting can therefore be a small step in awakening the social 
 
 
Ela, supra note 6, at 95.  
 241. This point extends from consumerism to the choice to use the terms and framework provided 
for by the current ―cultural exaltation of the market.‖ Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private 
Global Governance, supra note 46, at 2116. It is my belief that by using a market-centered form of 
argument in this paper, there might be more traction to the offsetting idea than there would be using 
more critical forms of argument. This paper‘s market-based framework hopefully will broaden and 
engage a wider audience. As Henry Smith observes, ―One can talk like a utilitarian without being 
one.‖ Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 974 (2009) (highlighting the advantages of 
adopting law and economics‘ simplifying style and theory).  
 242. Although written about the broader category, this structural critique against both 
consumption philanthropy and offsetting amounts to a claim that ―in its subordination of benevolence 
to the market, marketized philanthropy stabilizes the very system that results in poverty, disease, and 
environmental destruction.‖ Nickel & Eikenberry, supra note 45, at 975. The article continues, 
―Philanthropy reflected in, distributed by, and used in the service of capitalism can only be the voice of 
capitalism and the complete destruction of imagination of alternatives.‖ Id. at 986.  
 243. Although narrowly focused on the (RED) campaign‘s integrated offsetting, a critique labeled 
―A Capitalist Manifesto‖ highlights the direction of this objection to offsetting: ―In a striking diversion 
from Marx‘s well-known manifesto, the (RED) Manifesto is not a call to collectively rise up against 
the oppressive forces of capitalism, but rather a call to collectively rise up and support behemoths of 
capitalist production.‖ Anderson, supra note 80, at 40. See also Dadush, supra note 75, at 1290 (―Red 
expands choices and preserves Western consumption and lifestyle habits, while simultaneously 
creating the possibility of alleviating suffering in a different part of the world.‖).  
 244. For many people, re-examination of consumption as a moral activity will bring non-
economic values to bear on consumption choices. Even though ―[l]aw‘s most influential model of the 
consumer takes the form of a rational economic actor,‖ the model is incomplete. Kysar & 
Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 10829. As Michael Blumm asks, ―How many of us know only rational, 
wealth-maximizing, rent-seeking individuals; know no individuals whose moral compass includes 
non-economic values?‖ Blumm, supra note 131, at 372–73. See also Kysar, Preferences for Processes, 
supra note 7, at 617 (―[C]onsumption often is an intensely personal activity with significant moral 
consequences.‖).  
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consciousness of individuals, as consumers and as global citizens.
245
 The 
false imperative of radical change as the only path towards structural 
change must be rejected.
246
 Though theorists often critique smaller 
projects such as offsetting as not going far enough, once the possibility of 
incremental change is acknowledged, such critiques ring hollow.  
Offsetting does risk co-opting the socially responsible. By offering a 
way for individuals to act upon their inclination for social or 
environmental responsibility, effort that would have gone towards other 
activities may be channeled into offsetting.
247
 Such channeling is not 
necessarily a bad thing unless it also tempers people‘s broader 
commitments to social responsibility. Offsetting is relatively easy—you do 
not have to engage in public protest, volunteer your time, or even be 
politically active—and such ease may make offsetting too attractive.248 
The hedge against co-option is to continually highlight the limited 
ambition—to provide a mechanism to voluntarily correct for consumption-
related harms—of offsetting.249 Consumers are benefiting from a pricing 
scheme that, because of externalities and governance vacuums, does not 
reflect the true environmental and social costs of production. Consumers 
desiring not to be ―complicit with practices that they regard as immoral‖250 
or destructive are given a viable option to diminish their degree of 
complicity through offsetting. But there remains plenty of space and need 
for those who see themselves as socially responsible to do more. 
Offsetting provides opportunities to correct for consumption-based harms 
but does not foreclose recognition of non-consumption-based obligations.  
 
 
 
 245. Mechanisms allowing for consumption of social responsibility may be uniquely able to reach 
more people than pure politics can. Eric Arnould, for example, argues, ―[S]uccessful, progressive 
practices of citizenship ‗should‘ take place through market-mediated forms in our culture because 
these are the templates for action and understanding available to most people.‖ Eric J. Arnould, Should 
Consumer Citizens Escape the Market?, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 96, 105 (2007).  
 246. See UNGER, supra note 18, at 19–20, 74–76.  
 247. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 160, at 854 (noting that carbon offsetting ―may siphon off 
dollars and political will‖ from emission reduction efforts).  
 248. See also Dadush, supra note 75, at 132 (making the same point about cause related marketing 
and the (RED) campaign).  
 249. An environmental offsetting article argues that because offsetting is voluntary, offset 
schemes ―bypass[] the need to engage in the theoretical debates about whether individuals should be 
morally responsible for their emissions.‖ Brooke Ackerly & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change 
Justice: The Challenge for Global Governance, 20 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV. 553, 568 (2008) 
(emphasis in original). But the moral obligation to correct for consumption harms, although tempered 
by offsetting‘s voluntary nature, is implicit in that article and explicit here.  
 250. Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 7, at 616.  
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CONCLUSION 
Only a subset of American consumers will consider making offset 
payments. For a sizeable percentage of the poor and working class, rising 
inequality has made it hard for families to access the American dream, 
much less make voluntary charitable donations to offset their 
consumption.
251
 Even among the social classes for whom offsetting is an 
option, belief in market pricing and indifference to production processes 
will block many individuals from seriously considering offsetting their 
consumption. But, as environmental offsetting demonstrates, there is an 
emerging awareness that consumption can be associated with harms that 
are not priced into products and services. Our understanding of 
consumption and social responsibility is improved when we expand 
offsetting‘s scope to include non-environmental social harms, particularly 
those driven by the relationship between production, consumption, and 
poverty.
252
  
Although still in a nascent stage, offsetting practices and opportunities 
can be found for a range of products and with time are likely to be further 
institutionalized. Offsetting‘s current ad hoc nature invites entrepreneurs, 
policy makers, and global citizens to imagine institutions and norms that 
build upon the emerging offsetting practices of consumers.
253
 As 
consumption offsetting visibility increases, there is the possibility of 
change occurring rapidly through a cascading or bandwagon effect on the 
 
 
 251. The post-WWII period can be divided roughly in half. The first half, lasting until 1973, 
witnessed broad-based wage gains and rising productivity; in contrast, the second half has been 
marked by stagnant wages for the many classes of lower educated workers. Frank Levy & Thomas 
Kochan, Addressing the Problem of Stagnant Wages 1-4 (Emp‘t Pol‘y Research Network, Working 
Paper, 2011), available at http://www.employmentpolicy.org/files/field-content-file/pdf/Mike%20 
Lillich/EPRN%20WagesMay%2020%20-%20FL%20Edits_0.pdf; ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, 
STATE OF WORKING AMERICA Income Inequality Feature (2011), available at http://www.stateof 
workingamerica.org/articles/view/7. See also ISABEL V. SAWHILL & JOHN E. MORTON, ECONOMIC 
MOBILITY: IS THE AMERICAN DREAM ALIVE AND WELL? 13 (2007), available at http://www.economic 
mobility.org/assets/pdfs/PEW_EMP_AMERICAN_DREAM.pdf (―While belief in this American 
Dream remains a unifying tie for an increasingly diverse populace, it is showing signs of wear, with 
both public perceptions and concrete data suggesting that the nation is a less mobile society than once 
believed.‖).  
 252. For more on this possibility, see Rosser, Poverty Offsetting, supra note 4. 
 253. Numerous scholars have highlighted the role ―norm entrepreneurs‖ can play in bringing 
about societal change. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 929–30 (1996) (coining the term); Babcock, supra note 156, at 143–55; Robert C. Ellickson, The 
Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10–17 (2001). For more on law and social norms, 
see Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 637, 637 n.1 (2003) (collecting 
sources). Borrowing from Douglas Kysar, norm entrepreneurs can use offsetting to open up ―pockets 
of progressive activity . . . within the ‗ascendant market ideology‘ itself.‖ Kysar, Sustainable 
Development and Private Global Governance, supra note 46, at 2149.  
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practices and norms surrounding consumption.
254
 Improving the 
institutions of offsetting will strengthen the freedom- and welfare-
enhancing aspects of market transactions. While there is no single solution 
to global environmental- and poverty-related problems, consumption 
offsetting by individuals can, and should, be an important part of a multi-
pronged approach.  
 
 
 254. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683, 686 n.4 (1999) (collecting sources on the bandwagon effect); see also Ackerly & 
Vandenbergh, supra note 249, at 571 (―Equity offsets . . . [can help] lay[] the ground work for global 
public governance solutions.‖).  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
